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Abstract
We present a general model of legislative bargaining in which the status quo is an
arbitrary point in a multidimensional policy space. In contrast to other bargaining mod-
els, the status quo is not assumed to be “bad,” and delay may be Pareto efficient. We
prove existence of stationary equilibria. The possibility of equilibrium delay depends on
four factors: risk aversion of the legislators, the dimensionality of the policy space, the
voting rule, and the possibility of transfers across districts. If legislators are risk averse,
if there is more than one policy dimension, and if voting is by majority rule, for example,
then delay will almost never occur. In one dimension, delay is possible if and only if the
status quo lies in the core of the voting rule, and then it is the only possible outcome.
This “core selection” result yields a game-theoretic foundation for the well-known median
voter theorem. Our comparative statics analysis yield two noteworthy insights: (i) if the
status quo is close to the core, then equilibrium policy outcomes will also be close to the
core (a moderate status quo produces moderate policy outcomes), and (ii) if legislators
are patient, then equilibrium proposals will be close to the core (legislative patience leads
to policy moderation).
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A Bargaining Model of Legislative Policy-making∗†
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1 Introduction
A central objective of research in political economy is to obtain a general understanding
of the determinants of public policy in a majoritarian society. Black’s (1958) median
voter theorem provides compelling predictions when policies are restricted to a single di-
mension, but the theory of social choice has yielded quite negative results on the absence
of majority rule equilibria in multiple dimensions.1 A tool of potential importance in
surmounting this obstacle is the non-cooperative theory of bargaining, deriving from the
work of Rubinstein (1982). The theory has found numerous applications, including dis-
tributive politics (Baron and Ferejohn, 1989), government formation (Merlo, 1997, Dier-
meier, Eraslan, and Merlo, 2002), international relations (Powell, 2002), and bankruptcy
(Eraslan, 2002). Applications to policy-making in a legislative body, however, are few in
number and limited by the implicit assumption, nearly universal in the game-theoretic
literature on bargaining, that failure to reach an agreement is worse for all legislators
than every possible bargaining outcome.
This assumption of a “bad status quo” can be traced to Rubinstein (1982), who
considers the problem of two people who must agree on a division of a “cake” and who
take turns making offers and responding to offers. In the simplest version of this model,
a legislator’s payoff just equals his/her share of the cake, and, therefore, the payoff in
any period an agreement is not reached is simply zero: the status quo in this model is
no cake, which is obviously worse for the legislators than any division the two might
decide on. Binmore (1987) elaborates on the basic framework by allowing the proposer
to be randomly selected in each period. In a seminal paper, Baron and Ferejohn (1989)
apply this approach to model legislative allocation of pork barrel goods, assuming any
finite number of legislators and voting by majority rule: in their closed-rule model,
a legislator is randomly selected to propose an allocation of spending across districts;
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if this proposal is passed by a majority of the legislature, then the game ends with
that allocation; otherwise, the game continues to the next period, where this process is
repeated. Legislators do not enjoy the benefits of pork until it is allocated and so, as in
the basic model, the status quo is zero. The theory of bargaining in distributive settings
is now well-developed,2 but the application to pork barrel spending misses the public
good aspect of public policy and the fact that “more” is not always preferred to “less.”
The first application to public policy is due to Baron (1991), who considers examples
of policy-making in a two-dimensional issue space, assuming three and four legislators and
quadratic utilities. Thus, each legislator has circular indifference curves centered around
a unique “ideal point” in the policy space. Legislators are assumed to be perfectly patient,
however, so that delay is costless and considerations of the status quo are moot. Jackson
and Moselle (2002) assume a one-dimensional policy space in addition to a cake, and
Banks and Duggan (2000) generalize the above models by simply allowing any convex
set of policies and concave utilities. There, we prove existence of stationary equilibria
in multidimensional issue spaces and, for the case of one dimension, we show that the
equilibrium outcomes of bargaining converge to the ideal point of the median voter as the
legislators place greater weight on the future. These models of policy-making, except for
Baron (1991) who imposes perfect patience, follow the above-cited papers in assuming a
bad status quo. But while that assumption may be reasonable in the context of dividing
a cake or distributing pork, it is less desirable in a bargaining model of policy-making,
where it is likely that at least some legislators are happy with the status quo — and it is
very unlikely that every legislator prefers every policy to the status quo.
In this paper, we model the status quo as an arbitrary, perhaps Pareto efficient, policy.
We follow Banks and Duggan (2000) by allowing for a general multidimensional issue
space and general utility functions on the part of legislators. We assume the proposer
in any period is randomly selected, as in Baron and Ferejohn (1989), but agreement is
determined by an arbitrary voting rule, which we model as a collection of “decisive”
coalitions. This captures unanimity rule and majority rule, allows veto rules, and even
allows the legislators to be partitioned into two “houses,” a majority in each required
for passage. Our model generates insights into some well-known special cases, including
Romer and Rosenthal’s (1978a,b) agenda-setting model, in which a fixed proposer makes
a take-it-or-leave-it offer subject to a majority vote, as well as Krehbiel’s (1996, 1998)
model of a unicameral legislature with a filibuster rule and executive veto. We capture
these one-shot models by assuming impatient legislators (setting discount factors equal to
zero) and a single issue dimension, but our general framework allows us to investigate the
effects of adding an infinite-horizon (positive discount factors) and more issue dimensions.
Similarly, imbedding the model of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) in our framework, we can
consider the effects of changing the status quo from zero to, for example, equal division.
We show, for example, that adding an infinite horizon to the Romer-Rosenthal or Krehbiel
2Theoretical analyses building on this work have studied risk aversion (Harrington, 1989, 1990a,b),
externalities in consumption (Calvert and Dietz, 1996), veto rules (Winter, 1996; McCarty, 2000), a
stochastic cake (Merlo and Wilson, 1995; Eraslan and Merlo, 2002), and uniqueness of stationary equi-
libria (Eraslan, 2002; Cho and Duggan, 2002).
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models does not affect their results when utilities are quadratic, while a positive status
quo in the Baron-Ferejohn model reduces the rents of the proposer.
Our first general result is that, despite the fact that some legislators may favor the
status quo, there always exists a stationary equilibrium in which every proposal made
passes, i.e., there exists a “no-delay” stationary equilibrium. Furthermore, we prove that
the no-delay stationary equilibrium proposals are upper hemicontinuous in the parame-
ters of the model: small perturbations of the parameters cannot produce equilibria far
from those at the original specification. This is illustrated in Romer and Rosenthal’s
(1978a,b) agenda-setting model, where the setter’s proposal varies continuously with
voter ideal points and the status quo. An implication is that, if we give voters a small
amount of patience and give the agenda setter a proposal probability slightly less than
one, then equilibrium outcomes will be close to Romer and Rosenthal’s solution. And if
we imbed their model in a multidimensional space and ideal points are close to collinear,
then equilibrium outcomes will again be close to the original ones. Similar observations
also hold for Krehbiel’s (1996, 1998) legislative model. And if we modify the Baron and
Ferejohn (1989) model to allow for a status quo with slightly positive cake consumptions
or if we give the legislators a small amount of risk aversion, then the equilibrium outcomes
will be close to theirs.
An advantage of our approach to modelling the status quo is that we can now more
meaningfully consider the possibility of delay in bargaining, which, among the above-
mentioned models, was possible only with some probability of a larger cake in the future
(Merlo and Wilson, 1995; Eraslan and Merlo, 2002).3 We show that the possibility of
delay depends critically on four factors: the risk aversion of the legislators, the dimen-
sionality of the policy space, the voting rule used, and the possibility of transfers. We
prove that delay is possible in our model, but only if legislators are risk neutral and
transfers are impossible or if the equilibrium is “static,” in the sense that the status quo
is the outcome in every period with probability one. Furthermore, we show that static
equilibria are possible if and only if the status quo lies in the “core” of the underlying
voting game, i.e., there is no decisive coalition with the incentive to overturn it. Thus,
delay can occur only under very specific circumstances. We can say more when there are
two or more policy dimensions and voting is by majority rule: since the majority core is
almost surely empty in such environments, there will almost always be immediate agree-
ment in equilibrium. In contrast, if voting is by unanimity rule, then the core is just the
set of Pareto optimal policies, which is nonempty and generally quite large. We prove
that, if the status quo is Pareto optimal, then it is the unique stationary equilibrium
outcome of the model: either delay will be permanent or the status quo may be proposed
and passed, but no other policies are possible.
Our results on majority rule are sharpest for one dimension. We show that, not only
is the status quo being in the core necessary and sufficient for the existence of at least
one static equilibrium, but it implies that every stationary equilibrium is static. Thus,
when the status quo is in the core, the equilibrium outcome of bargaining (which is
3Delay can also be obtained by adding incomplete information to the model. See Rubinstein (1985).
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the status quo every period) necessarily lies in the core. We refer to this phenomenon
as “core selection,” related to the notion of “core equivalence” in Banks and Duggan
(2000). In contrast to the results in that paper, which assume very patient legislators,
here we make no assumption about the rate of time discounting by legislators, though
we must assume that the status quo is in the core, an issue that does not arise when
legislators do not care about delay. When voting is by majority rule, of course, it is
known that the core consists of the median policies, and our core selection result yields a
new game-theoretic perspective on Black’s (1958) median voter theorem: whereas Black
arrives at the median from a social choice theory approach, we give conditions under
which strategic, forward-looking legislators arrive at the same outcome. We also show
that, if the status quo is not in the core, then it is never proposed. Thus, occurrence
of the status quo in equilibrium is “all or nothing,” i.e., it is always proposed by every
legislator (if it is in the core) or never proposed by any legislator (if it is outside the
core). We show that there will always be at least one core point that is proposed with
positive probability in equilibrium, but, if the status quo is not in the core, then there
will necessarily be other policies proposed too.
Finally, we present comparative static results on the patience of legislators and on the
location of the status quo. Our results apply either if there is a single issue dimension
or even in multiple dimensions if voting is by unanimity rule. First, as a corollary of
our core selection and continuity results, if the status quo is close to the core, then the
stationary equilibrium proposals of the legislators will also be close to the core. In other
words, moderate status quos lead to moderate policy outcomes. Second, if the legislators
are sufficiently patient, then, regardless of the location of the status quo, all equilibrium
proposals will be arbitrarily close to the core. That is, legislative patience leads to policy
moderation. The latter comparative static delivers an asymptotic version of the median
voter theorem, one that is independent of the location of the status quo. It also suggests
the following for the design of electoral institutions, which are unmodelled here: if we
view the discount factor of a legislator as corresponding to the probability of reelection,
then systems that offer a sufficient incumbency advantage will lead to moderate policies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and
formal definition of our equilibrium concept. In Section 3, we present a number of special
cases, including the Romer and Rosenthal (1978a,b) agenda-setting model, Kriehbiel’s
(1996, 1998) legislative bargaining model, and a version of the Baron and Ferejohn (1989)
bargaining model with an arbitrary status quo. In Section 4, we present our results on
equilibrium existence, stability of the status quo, and core selection. In Section 5, we
end with some concluding remarks. An Appendix contains proofs of theorems and other
technical considerations.
2 The Legislative Bargaining Model
Let X ⊆ <d denote a nonempty, compact, convex set of policies with at least two policy
alternatives, and let q ∈ X denote the status quo policy. Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote a
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set of legislators, with n ≥ 2, who play an infinite-horizon bargaining game over the set
of policies. The timing of interaction is as follows. If no policy has been accepted prior
to period t, then (1) legislator i is recognized with probability ρi ≥ 0, where ∑i∈N ρi = 1;
then (2) the selected legislator i makes a proposal pi ∈ X; then (3) every legislator j ∈ N
simultaneously votes to either accept or reject the proposal. The recognition probabilities,
ρ1, . . . , ρn, are exogenously fixed throughout the game. Let D ⊆ 2N \ {∅} denote a
collection of decisive coalitions, also exogenously fixed.4 If the group of legislators voting
for the proposal is decisive, i.e., {j ∈ N | j accepts } ∈ D, then the proposal pi is the
chosen policy and bargaining ends with outcome pi in period t and in every subsequent
period. Otherwise, the outcome in period t is q, and steps 1-3 are repeated for period
t+ 1.
We impose on the voting rule D only the minimal conditions that it is nonempty and
monotonic, in the sense that any superset of a decisive coalition is itself decisive: C ∈ D
and C ⊆ C ′ imply C ′ ∈ D. Thus, we allow for a variety of voting rules beyond majority
rule (D = {C ⊆ N | |C| > n/2}), such as unanimity rule (D = {N}), and dictatorship
(D = {C ⊆ N | i ∈ C} for some i ∈ N). For another example, a proposal may require a
majority of legislators other than a designated legislator, say n, to pass, i.e.,
DRR =
{
C ⊆ N
∣∣∣∣ |C \ {n}| > n− 12
}
.
Letting ρn = 1, we have the set-up of the agenda-setting model of Romer and Rosenthal
(1978a,b), where legislator n plays the role of agenda setter. Or we can capture a unicam-
eral legislature and executive with a filibuster rule (3/5 cloture rule) and executive veto
(2/3 override rule) as follows. Letting n denote the executive and N \{n} the legislature,
define
DK =
{
C ⊆ N
∣∣∣∣∣ |C \ {n}| ≥ 2(n− 1)3 or both n ∈ C and |C \ {n}| ≥ 3(n− 1)5
}
,
That is, a coalition is decisive if it contains two thirds of the legislature or three fifths
plus the executive. Letting m denote the “median” legislator and ρm = 1, we have the
set-up of the legislative model of Krehbiel (1996, 1998). Some of our results do use the
assumption that D is proper, i.e., if C ∈ D, then N \ C /∈ D. This is clearly a weak
condition: when D is used to define strict social preferences, as in the theory of social
choice, it is always satisfied.
Each legislator i’s preferences over sequences of policy outcomes are described by a
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility representation ui:X → < and a common discount
factor δ ∈ [0, 1) as follows. Given a sequence x1, x2, . . . of policies over time, legislator i’s
payoff takes the usual form:
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1ui(xt).
4In the terminology of cooperative game theory, D describes a “simple game,” and the elements of D
are “winning coalitions.”
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Of course, the outcomes of the bargaining game defined above are of a simple form: either
the status quo obtains in every period, in which case i’s payoff is just ui(q), or some other
proposal is passed in some period; in that case, i receives payoff
(1− δt−1)ui(q) + δt−1ui(x)
if policy x is proposed and accepted in period t.
We assume throughout that each ui is continuous and concave. In the Appendix,
we define a further technical condition on utilities that is assumed throughout. The
condition, called limited shared weak preference (LSWP), says that any policy y that is
weakly preferred to a policy x by all members of a decisive coalition can be approximated
by policies that all coalition members strictly prefer to x. An implication of LSWP, with
our other conditions, is that each legislator i has a unique ideal point, denoted x˜i, that
is strictly preferred to every other policy, i.e., ui(x˜
i) > ui(y) for all y ∈ X \ {x˜i}. Many
familiar environments satisfy LSWP, including the following.5
• Classical spatial model/Pure public goods. Policies may have ideological content,
each ui is strictly quasi-concave, as when ui(x) = −||x − x˜i|| or ui(x) = −||x −
x˜i||2. Or, policies may represent levels of public goods provided, each ui may be
monotonic with, for example, a Cobb-Douglas form.
• Public decisions with transfers. The policy space X is a subset of Z×T , where Z is
a space of public decisions and T ⊆ <n is a space of allocations of a district-specific
good, and each ui is quasi-linear: ui(z, t) = φi(z)+ti, with φi strictly quasi-concave.
• Divide the dollar. The policy space is X = {(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ <n+ |
∑
i∈N xi ≤ 1}, rep-
resenting allocations of pork to legislative districts, and ui(x) is strictly increasing
in xi, constant in the consumption of other legislative districts.
• Local public good economy. Alternatives are allocations of any number of local pub-
lic goods to districts, where each ui is strictly quasi-concave and strictly monotonic
in the consumption of i’s district, constant in the consumption of other districts.
The more familiar condition of strict quasi-concavity is sufficient for LSWP, but it is not
satisfied in the last three models, which we consider to be of potential importance for
applications. The last model, in particular, generalizes divide-the-dollar environments
but has not to our knowledge been considered in analyses of legislative policy-making.
We therefore use the weaker LSWP condition.
Given a collection of decisive coalitions and legislator preferences, we define the core,
denoted K, as the set of policies that cannot be “overturned” by any decisive coalition.
Formally,
K =
{
x ∈ X
∣∣∣∣∣ there do not exist y ∈ X and C ∈ Dsuch that, for all i ∈ C, ui(y) > ui(x)
}
.
5In Banks and Duggan (1999), we prove that LSWP holds in two general models, from which all of
the examples below can be obtained as special cases.
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For a familiar example of the core, let the voting rule D be unanimity rule, so that a
policy x is in the core if and only if there is no policy y such that ui(y) > ui(x) for every
legislator i ∈ N , i.e., x is weakly Pareto optimal. In this case, the core is nonempty and
often quite large. When the set of policies is one-dimensional and D is majority rule, it is
known that the core is nonempty and consists of the median ideal point, or perhaps the
interval between two median ideal points if the number of legislators is even. The core
has a similar characterization in the general one-dimensional case, as long as the voting
rule is proper: it is nonempty and consists of the interval between two legislators’ ideal
points.6 In higher dimensional spaces, however, Plott (1967) and others have shown that
the majority core points must satisfy conditions so restrictive that they would almost
never be met in reality. Banks (1995) and Saari (1997) extend these results to other
voting rules that require less than unanimity for passage. Thus, if there are many issue
dimensions, the core is typically empty for such voting rules.
Complete information of preferences, the structure of the game form, etc., is assumed
throughout. A history of length t in the bargaining game describes all that has tran-
spired in the first t periods (who the previous proposers were, what they proposed, how
legislators voted), and a strategy for a legislator is a mapping specifying an intended
action (what to propose, how to vote) as a function of all histories of all lengths. Since
our focus in this paper is only on equilibria in stationary strategies, we provide a formal
definition only of such strategies. A (pure) stationary strategy for legislator i consists of
a proposal pi ∈ X, to be offered anytime i is recognized, and a measurable voting rule
ri:X → {accept, reject}. For the latter, we will use the more convenient representation
of an acceptance set, Ai = r
−1
i (accept), i.e., the set of proposals that i would vote to
accept. Given a profile (A1, . . . , An) of acceptance sets and given C ⊆ N , define the set
AC =
⋂
i∈C
Ai
of proposals acceptable to all members of C, and define the social acceptance set
A =
⋃
C∈D
AC ,
consisting of proposals that could be passed in any and all periods.
It turns out that mixtures over proposals are required for our most general existence
result, so let P(X) denote the set of Borel probability measures on X and endow P(X)
with the topology of weak convergence.7 Given measurable Y ⊆ X, let P(Y ) denote
the subset of Borel probability measures on X that place probability one on Y . Let
pii ∈ P(X) denote a mixed stationary proposal for legislator i, and let pi = (pi1, . . . , pin)
denote a profile of mixed stationary proposals. A mixed stationary strategy for i is a pair
σi = (pii, Ai), and we let σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) denote a profile of mixed stationary strategies.
6See the Appendix for a formal statement.
7A sequence {pik} of probability measures converges weakly to pi if and only if, for every (bounded)
continuous function f :X → <, we have ∫ fdpik → ∫ fdpi.
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It is important to note that any randomization over proposals takes place before voting:
the legislators know which policy has been proposed before they cast their votes.
Informally, a profile σ constitutes a stationary equilibrium if, for every legislator
i ∈ N , the proposal strategy pii is optimal given the acceptance sets (A1, . . . , An) of
the other legislators, and the acceptance set Ai is optimal given that σ describes what
would happen if the current proposal were rejected. To formalize these conditions, note
first that any strategy profile σ defines in an obvious (if notationally dense) manner a
probability distribution over sequences of outcomes and, with it, an expected utility vi(σ)
for each legislator i ∈ N as evaluated at the beginning of the game. By stationarity, this
is also i’s continuation value throughout the game, i.e., i’s expected utility evaluated at
the beginning of next period if the current period’s proposal is rejected.
Formally, σ is a stationary equilibrium if two conditions hold. First, we require that
the legislators’ acceptance sets satisfy weak dominance, i.e., legislator i votes for proposal
x if and only if the utility from x is at least that of rejecting the proposal and continuing
to the next period.8 That is, for all i ∈ N , we require that
Ai = {x ∈ X | ui(x) ≥ (1− δ)ui(q) + δvi(σ)}.
This condition eliminates implausible equilibria in which, for instance, under majority
rule everyone accepts every proposal independently of preferences: the problem in such
situations is that no one’s vote will change the outcome of the game, and hence everyone’s
vote is a best response, despite the fact that some legislators may be voting for undesirable
policies. Note that weak dominance implies q ∈ Ai if δ = 0. Second, we require that
the legislators’ proposals satisfy sequential rationality, i.e., legislator i, when recognized
as proposer, either chooses utility-maximizing outcomes from within A or chooses an
outcome that will be rejected, depending on which yields the higher payoff. That is, for
all i ∈ N , we require that
pii(argmax{ui(y) | y ∈ A}) = 1
when sup{ui(y) | y ∈ A} > (1−δ)ui(q)+δvi(σ); that pii(X\A) = 1 when the inequality is
reversed;9 and that pii place probability one on the union of these two sets when equality
holds.
The explicit formula for legislator i’s continuation value, given stationary strategy
profile σ, is straightforward to derive: it is
vi(σ) =
∑
j∈N ρj [
∫
A ui(z)pij(dz) + (1− δ)pij(X \ A)ui(q)]
1− δ∑j∈N ρjpij(X \ A) . (1)
Since the discount factor δ is identical across legislators, we may write each vi(σ) as the
expectation of ui with respect to a single probability measure, say ν, independent of i.
8Baron and Kalai (1993) refer to such strategies as “stage-undominated.”
9Note that, when the inequality is reversed, it follows that X \A 6= ∅.
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This is explicitly defined in the Appendix. Letting µ denote the point mass on q, now
define the probability measure γ = (1− δ)µ + δν, so that the expectation ∫ uidγ is just
(1− δ)ui(q) + δvi(σ). Thus, weak dominance can be written as
Ai =
{
x ∈ X | ui(x) ≥
∫
ui(z)γ(dz)
}
.
That is, legislator i votes for proposals with utility at least equal to i’s expected utility
under γ. Because γ contains all of the relevant information for any legislator to evaluate
any proposed policy, we refer to γ as the continuation distribution corresponding to σ.
Letting
x(γ) =
∫
zγ(dz)
denote the mean of the continuation distribution, concavity of ui implies ui(x(γ)) ≥∫
uidγ. We conclude that, given any profile σ satisfying weak dominance, x(γ) ∈ Ai for
every legislator i ∈ N . In particular, the social acceptance set A will be nonempty for
such profiles.
A stationary equilibrium with delay is a profile σ in which, with some positive proba-
bility, a proposal is rejected in the first (or any) period. Formally, this is
∑
i∈N ρipii(A) <
1. A no-delay stationary equilibrium is then a profile such that each legislator proposes
only policies in the acceptance set, i.e.,
∑
i∈N ρipii(A) = 1. Note that the status quo
may be the outcome of a no-delay equilibrium, if it is in the social acceptance set and it
is proposed with positive probability, i.e., if q ∈ A and pii({q}) > 0 for some legislator
i. Note also that, in a no-delay equilibrium, legislator i’s continuation value takes the
especially simple form,
vi(σ) =
∑
j∈N
ρj
∫
ui(z)pij(dz), (2)
where the terms in (1) multiplied by pii(X \A) disappear, as they correspond to outcomes
following rejected proposals.
A static stationary equilibrium is one in which the status quo is maintained with
probability one, either because no policy is ever passed or because the status quo is the
only policy passed with positive probability. Formally, these are profiles σ such that∑
i∈N ρipii(A \ {q}) = 0. Such equilibria might exhibit delay or might not, as when the
status quo is socially acceptable and all legislators propose it.
3 Special Cases of the Model
In this section, we survey some special cases of the bargaining model and provide explicit
solutions for stationary equilibria. Models 1, 2, and 5 imbed well-known models in the
infinite-horizon framework with an arbitrary status quo. Other special cases extend the
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theory to new environments, such as the one-dimensional Model 3, where the comparison
between the equilibria of our model and the predictions of the median voter theorem are
particularly interesting. While interesting applications in their own right, these examples
will motivate many of the theoretical results to follow, and they will serve to demonstrate
the limits of those results as well.
Model 1: The Romer-Rosenthal model. Let the agenda setter be n with ρn = 1, let
the number n− 1 of voters be odd, let X ⊆ <, let the voting rule be DRR, and let each
ui be quadratic with ideal point x˜i, i.e., ui(x) = −|x − x˜i|2. Let legislator m have the
median ideal point among N \ {n}, and assume x˜m < x˜n. Though Romer and Rosenthal
(1978a,b) analyze a static model, i.e., δ = 0, we allow any δ < 1 here. By Lemma 1 of
Banks and Duggan (2001), the assumption of quadratic utilities implies that legislator m
is decisive: x ∈ A if and only if um(x) ≥ (1−δ)um(q)+δvm(σ) in any no-delay stationary
equilibrium. Thus, legislator n’s proposal pn must satisfy
um(pn) ≥ (1− δ)um(q) + δvm(σ) (3)
in any no-delay equilibrium. Assuming q is close enough to x˜m, namely |q − x˜m| <
|x˜n−x˜m|, this constraint will be binding: otherwise, since um(pn) = vm(σ) in equilibrium,
we would have um(pn) > um(q), and the agenda setter would do better to propose
slightly to the right of pn, contradicting sequential rationality. Thus, when the status
quo is close to the median legislator, the proposal constraint (3) is indeed binding. Since
um(pn) = vm(σ) in equilibrium, we must therefore have um(pn) = um(q). We conclude
that the unique no-delay stationary equilibrium, independent of the discount factor, is
such that pn = x˜m + |q − x˜m|, as in Romer and Rosenthal’s static model.
In the above model, the status quo is proposed by the agenda setter if and only if it
coincides with the core of the voting rule DRR, i.e., q = x˜m. In this case, the core point
is the unique policy outcome. And when the status quo is close to the core, the agenda
setter n’s optimal proposal is close to the core as well. Note that we used the assumption
of quadratic utilities to derive the same solution in our infinite-horizon model as did
Romer and Rosenthal (1979a,b) in their static model. If that assumption is relaxed, the
models will generally have different solutions.
Model 2: The Krehbiel model. Let n be the executive, let the number n−1 of legislators
be odd, let X = [0, 1], let the voting rule be DK , and let each ui be quadratic with ideal
point x˜i. Let legislator m have the median ideal point among N \ {n}, and let ρm = 1.
Though Krehbiel (1996,1998) analyzes a static model, i.e., δ = 0, we allow any δ < 1
here. Assuming the executive’s ideal point is greater than those of the legislators, index
the legislators in increasing order of their ideal points: x˜1 < x˜2 < · · · < x˜n. Identify the
legislators v = 2(n− 1)/3 (the “veto pivot”) and f = 2(n− 1)/5 (the “filibuster pivot”).
(We ignore integer problems here.) It can be checked that the core of the voting rule DK
is just [x˜f , x˜v]. In any no-delay stationary equilibrium σ, legislator i votes for proposal x
if and only if ui(x) ≥ (1− δ)ui(q) + δvi(σ). Letting pm denote legislator m’s equilibrium
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proposal, we argue that it must take the following form. First, we claim that, if q < x˜f ,
then
pm = min{2x˜f − q, x˜m}.
To see why, note that sequential rationality trivially implies q ≤ pm. Furthermore,
vi(σ) = ui(pm) for every legislator i ∈ N in any no-delay stationary equilibrium, so i votes
for pm in equilibrium if and only if ui(pm) ≥ ui(q). Then we must have uf (pm) ≥ uf (q),
for otherwise the proposal would not receive the vote of the filibuster pivot f or any
legislator i ≤ f , so less than three fifths of legislators would vote to accept, and the
proposal would fail, a contradiction. An implication is that pm ≤ 2x˜f −q. That pm ≤ x˜m
follows from sequential rationality: if x˜m < pm ≤ 2x˜f − q, then the median legislator
could propose slightly to the left of pm, this proposal would still gain the support of
every legislator i ≥ f and still pass,10 improving the outcome for m and contradicting
sequential rationality. Thus, pm is no greater than 2x˜f − q or x˜m. If pm is strictly less
than the minimum of these two quantities, i.e., pm < min{2x˜f − q, x˜m}, then the median
legislator would do better to propose slightly to the right of pm, again contradicting
sequential rationality. This establishes the claim. Second, if q ∈ [x˜f , x˜v], then we can
show that pm = q. Last, if x˜v < q, then we have
pm = max{2x˜v − q, x˜m}.
In fact, this is the solution derived by Krehbiel in his static model. Note that, as the status
quo moves from zero to x˜f , pm moves from the median toward x˜f ; for q ∈ [x˜f , x˜v], pm
equals the status quo; and as the status quo moves from x˜v to one, pm moves continuously
away from x˜v and toward x˜m.
In the above model, the status quo is not proposed by the median legislator unless
it is in the core of the voting rule DK . If the status quo does lie in the core, the
interval [x˜f , x˜v], then it is the median legislator’s unique optimal proposal and the unique
bargaining outcome in every period. This can certainly occur while the status quo is
distinct from the median legislator’s ideal point, i.e., q 6= x˜m, and in that case a majority
of legislators would in fact prefer the median ideal point to the bargaining outcome, a
phenomenon referred to as “gridlock” by Krehbiel (1996, 1998). The above analysis shows
that gridlock either does not occur (a policy other than the status quo is proposed by
the median legislator and passes) or is complete (the status quo obtains in every period).
Finally, note that when the status quo is close to the core, the median legislator’s optimal
proposal is close to the core as well.
The next model gives our first example of the bargaining approach applied to the case
of a one-dimensional policy variable.
Model 3: One dimension, majority rule. Let n be odd, let X = [0, 1], let each ρi = 1/n,
let D be majority rule, and let each ui be quadratic with ideal point x˜i. Assume x˜1 <
10The argument that all legislators i ≥ f to the right of the filibuster pivot would vote for the
new proposal uses the fact that, with quadratic utilities, legislator preferences over lotteries are “order
restricted.” This is proved by Cho and Duggan (2002).
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x˜2 < · · · < x˜n, and let q ≤ x˜m, where m = (n + 1)/2 is the median legislator. We look
for a no-delay stationary equilibrium of the following form: pi = x˜m −∆ for all i < m,
pm = x˜m, and pi = x˜i + ∆ for all i > m, where ∆ > 0 is fixed. Let each Ai consist of
the policies that give legislator i utility at least vi = (1− δ)ui(q) + (δ/n)∑nj=1 ui(pj). By
construction, therefore, weak dominance will be satisfied. We then need only find a value
of ∆ consistent with sequential rationality. By Lemma 1 of Banks and Duggan (2001),
legislator m is decisive: x ∈ A if and only if um(x) ≥ (1− δ)um(q)+ δvm. So let ∆ satisfy
um(x˜m −∆) = (1− δ)um(q) + δ
n
[∑
i<m
um(x˜m −∆) + um(x˜m) +
∑
i>m
um(x˜m +∆)
]
,
or, equivalently,
∆2 = (1− δ)(x˜m − q)2 + δ(n− 1)
n
∆2.
Solving, we find that
∆ =
√√√√(1− δ)(x˜m − q)2
1− δ(n− 1)/n .
For δ close enough to one or for q close enough to x˜m, we have x˜i < pi = minA for all
i < m and maxA = pi < x˜i for all i > m, delivering sequential rationality. When q = x˜m,
we have ∆ = 0, so that every legislator proposes the median and it is the outcome with
probability one. It would then also be an equilibrium for every legislator to propose zero
while keeping the same acceptance sets as in the latter equilibrium: then every proposal
will be rejected, so the equilibrium exhibits delay, and the median is still the outcome
with probability one.
In the above model, we have found a stationary equilibrium in pure strategies, and
the equilibrium is no-delay. Furthermore, the core point, x˜m, is proposed and passed
with positive probability, but other proposals may be passed as well. Finally, the social
acceptance set collapses to the core as legislators become arbitrarily patient or as the
status quo converges to the core: ∆ → 0 as δ → 1 or as q → x˜m. This illustrates the
general claims made above that legislative patience leads to moderate outcomes, as do
moderate status quos. Note also that when the status quo coincides with the legislative
median, i.e., q = x˜m, the social acceptance set collapses to this point, and the core policy
is selected with probability one. Otherwise, when q 6= x˜m, the status quo is the outcome
with probability zero. Thus, as in the Romer-Rosenthal and Krehbiel models, the status
quo is an “all or nothing” proposition.
Model 4: Two dimensions, core point exists. Let n = 5, X = [−1, 1]× [−1, 1], let each
ρi = 1/5, let q = (0, 0), let D be majority rule, and let ui(x) = −||x− x˜i||λ, with λ ≥ 1
and ideal points at (0, 0), (1, 0), (−1, 0), (0, 1), and (0,−1). That is, the legislators’ ideal
points are at the center and four corners of a square, and indifference curves are perfect
circles centered around them. Of course, the unique core point is (0, 0). We look for a
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no-delay stationary equilibrium of the form pi = (1 − α)x˜i for each legislator i, where
α ∈ (0, 1), and i’s proposal is accepted by the legislators at the two adjacent corners of
the square. In such an equilibrium, legislator i with x˜i 6= (0, 0) would have continuation
value
vi = −δ
5
[αλ + 1 + 2(2− 2α+ α2)λ + (2− α)λ].
Letting Ai consist of the policies x satisfying ||x− x˜i||λ ≤ (1− δ)− δvi, weak dominance
will be satisfied. We then need only specify a value of α consistent with sequential
rationality. We do so for the values λ = 2, 4. When λ = 2, it is straightforward to verify
that α = 1, i.e., pi = (0, 0) for every legislator i ∈ N , yields a stationary equilibrium: in
this case, each legislator’s continuation value is −1 and each accepts a proposal only if it
yields a utility at least that of the core point; then the optimal proposal is indeed (0, 0).
When λ = 4, this is still an equilibrium. It can be checked that α = 0, meaning that
all legislators propose their own ideal points, is also an equilibrium, as long as δ ≥ 3/4.
Consider the proposal of the legislator with ideal point (1, 0). She proposes (1, 0), which
gives the adjacent legislators utility −4. Their continuation values are −5δ. So given
our specification of acceptance sets, they accept (1, 0) if 4 ≤ 1 + 4δ, which holds if
δ ≥ 3/4. Thus, (1, 0) is accepted by a majority and is that legislator’s optimal proposal,
and similarly for the other legislators.
In the above model, regardless of λ, the status quo is proposed by the legislator with
ideal point at the status quo, which is in the core. In contrast to the q = x˜m case
from Model 3, there may be no-delay equilibria in which other legislators propose other
policies, even though the status quo is in the core. In contrast with all of the preceding
models, in the next the core is empty.
Model 5: The Baron and Ferejohn model with arbitrary status quo. Let n be odd, let
X = {(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ <n+ |
∑
i∈N xi ≤ 1} be the unit simplex in <n, let D be majority rule,
and let ui(x1, . . . , xn) = xi. We generalize Baron and Ferejohn (1989) by allowing for
an arbitrary q ∈ X, whereas they assume q = 0. We will look for a no-delay stationary
equilibrium such that each legislator offers a positive amount of cake to a randomly
chosen subset of (n − 1)/2 other legislators, and each legislator’s expected payoff from
rejection is
r =
1
n
((1− δ)(
n∑
i=1
qi) + δ). (4)
Also let si denote the probability that, conditional on not being the proposer, legislator i
is offered a positive amount of the cake, e.g., si = 1/2 if all proposers randomize uniformly
over subsets of legislators. In such an equilibrium, if i offers a positive amount of cake to
another legislator, that amount will simply be r. Thus, the optimal payoff to a legislator
i when selected to propose will be
1− r
(
n− 1
2
)
,
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reflecting the fact that i offers r to (n − 1)/2 others and keeps the rest of the cake.
Legislator i’s continuation value in such an equilibrium would be
vi = (1− ρi)sir + ρi
(
1− r(n− 1)
2
)
,
reflecting the fact that, when someone else proposes, i is offered the amount r with
probability si. Then i’s payoff from rejecting a proposal is
(1− δ)qi + δ(1− ρi)sir + δρi
(
1− r(n− 1)
2
)
.
Setting this equal to r and solving for si, we have
si =
r − (1− δ)qi − δρi
(
1− r(n−1)
2
)
δ(1− ρi)r
=
r − δρi
(
1− r(n−1)
2
)
δ(1− ρi)r − qi
1− δ
δ(1− ρi)r . (5)
For the case qi = q ∈ [0, 1/n] for all i ∈ N , so the legislators have equal consumption q
of the cake in the status quo, and each ρi = 1/n, we then have si = 1/2 and
r = (1− δ)q + δ
n
.
Thus, a subset of (n−1)/2 non-proposers is chosen at random with each member offered
r, defined above, while the proposer keeps 1− r(n− 1)/2, or equivalently,
1− (1− δ)(n− 1)q
2
+
δ(n− 1)
2n
.
Setting q = 0, as in Baron and Ferejohn (1989), non-proposers are offered r = δ/n and
the proposer keeps 1 − δ(n − 1)/2n. Setting q = 1/n, so the legislators split the cake
evenly in the status quo, non-proposers are offered 1/n and the proposer keeps (n+1)/2n.
Thus, increasing the status quo q decreases the rent of the proposer. If the recognition
probabilities are close to 1/n and the status quo is close to q = (q, . . . , q), then the
probability that i is offered a positive amount of the cake is given by (5), and the amount
of the offer is given by (4). The probabilities in (5) correspond to stationary equilibria
whenever si ∈ [0, 1] for each i.11 Assuming ∑ni=1 qi = 1, so the status quo is Pareto
efficient, the conditions for this are as follows. When qi ≥ 1/n, then si ≥ 0 if and only if
ρi <
2
n+ 1
and
2(nqi − 1)
2− ρi(n+ 1) ≤
δ
1− δ ,
11A caveat is that si is the “marginal” probability on i being offered a positive amount of cake, derived
from a distribution on subsets of size (n − 1)/2. Given an arbitrary (s1, . . . , sn), there is the question
of whether these marginal probabilities can be derived from such a distribution. A necessary condition
is that
∑
si = n/2, a condition satisfied by (5) when each ρi = 1/n. The condition is sufficient when
n = 3, but we leave the question of the general case open.
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and si ≤ 1 is not binding. When qi ≤ 1/n, then si ≥ 0 if and only if either ρi < 2/(n+1)
or
ρi >
2
n+ 1
and
2(nqi − 1)
2− ρi(n+ 1) ≥
δ
1− δ ,
and si ≤ 1 if and only if
2(nqi − 1)
n− 1 ≤
δρi
1− δ .
When ρi = qi = 1/n, as mentioned above, si = 1/2 ∈ [0, 1] and the above conditions
hold for all δ. An implication is that we do not have equilibria of the conjectured form
in certain cases, e.g., when qi > 1/n and ρi is too high, or when qi > 1/n, ρi is low, but
δ is too low. In the latter cases, there is no way to bring i’s expected payoff of rejection
down to r, and, in equilibrium, i will never be offered a positive amount of the cake.
In the next model, the core is also empty, but bargaining takes place in a spatial
environment similar to that of Baron (1991), with the important difference that legislators
are not perfectly patient and the status quo now belongs to the policy space. In contrast
to the preceding models, mixed proposal strategies play an important role in our analysis.
Model 6: Two dimensions, no core point. Let n = 3, let X be the unit simplex in
<3, let each ρi = 1/3, let q be on an edge of the simplex, let D be majority rule, and
let ui(x) = u(−||x− x˜i||) for each i, where u(·) is a strictly increasing, concave function
and the ideal points are at the vertices of the simplex. Specifically, let x˜1 = (1, 0, 0),
x˜2 = (0, 1, 0), and x˜3 = (0, 0, 1). Without loss of generality, assume q is between x˜1 and
x˜2, with
||x˜1 − q|| < ||x˜2 − q|| < ||x˜3 − q||,
as in Figure 1. Define
u′ = u(||x˜1 − q||), u′′ = u(||x˜2 − q||), u′′′ = u(||x˜3 − q||),
and note that u′ > u′′ > u′′′. For use later, let
r =
u′′ − u′′′
u′ − u′′ .
Let a2 = q, and let a3 be the point on the edge between x˜1 and x˜3 that is the same
distance as q from x˜1, i.e.,
a3 = x˜1 +
||q − x˜1||√
2
(−1, 0, 1).
Let b1 be the point on the edge between x˜2 and x˜1 that is the same distance, ||q − x˜1||,
from x˜2; let b3 be the point on the edge between x˜2 and x˜3 that is ||q− x˜1|| from x˜2. And
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let c1 and c2 be between x˜3 and, respectively, x˜1 and x˜2, both a distance of ||q− x˜1|| from
x˜3. See Figure 1.
[ Figure 1 about here. ]
We will look for a no-delay stationary equilibrium in which legislator 1 proposes a2 to
legislator 2 and a3 to legislator 3, 2 proposes b1 to 1 and b3 to 3, and 3 proposes c1 to
1 and c2 to 2. Denote the probability that 1 proposes to i = 2, 3 by αi; denote the
probability that 2 proposes to i = 1, 3 by βi; and denote the probability that 3 proposes
to i = 1, 2 by γi. In such an equilibrium, the legislators’ continuation values would be
v1 =
δ
3
[u′ + (β1 + γ1)u′′ + (β3 + γ2)u′′′]
v2 =
δ
3
[u′ + (α2 + γ2)u′′ + (α3 + γ1)u′′′]
v3 =
δ
3
[u′ + (α3 + β2)u′′ + (α2 + β1)u′′′].
Imposing weak dominance, the proposals c1 and c2 are optimal for legislator 3 if they
give 1 and 2 exactly their expected payoffs of rejecting the proposal, i.e., c1 must give 1
a payoff of (1− δ)u′ + δv1, and c2 must give 2 a payoff of (1− δ)u′′ + δv2. Since c1 gives
1 a payoff of u′′, we must have
u′′ = (1− δ)u′ + δ
3
[u′ + (β1 + γ1)u′′ + (β3 + γ2)u′′′],
or equivalently,
u′′ =
(3− 2δ)u′ + δ(β3 + γ2)u′′′
3− δ(β1 + γ1) .
This condition will hold when the proposal probabilities satisfy
β3 + γ2 =
3− 2δ
rδ
. (6)
Since b1 also gives 1 a payoff of u′′, this condition also ensures that 2 cannot find a
better policy to propose to 1. Similarly, c2 and a2 give 2 a payoff of u′′ if the proposal
probabilities satisfy
α3 + γ1 =
1
r
. (7)
Finally, a3 and b3 give 3 a payoff of u′′ if
α2 + β1 = 1 + 3r − 3r
δ
. (8)
We have left to find conditions on the primitives of our model under which there exist
proposal probabilities satisfying (6), (7), (8), and the usual contraints:
α2 + α3 = 1, β1 + β3 = 1, γ1 + γ2 = 1,
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and non-negativity. Solutions to this problem will yield mixed proposal strategies satis-
fying sequential rationality and, hence, no-delay stationary equilibria. See Figure 2 for a
visual illustration of the legislators’ acceptance sets and optimal proposals.
[ Figure 2 about here. ]
It can be checked that, if r ≥ 1, then solutions exist if and only if
δ ≥ 3r
2
1 + 3r2
,
in which case γ2 ≥ α3 > β1. If r ≤ 1, then solutions exist if and only if
δ ≥ 3
3 + r
,
in which case α3 ≥ γ2 > β1. Thus, given any location of the status quo, and with it r,
there exists a no-delay stationary equilibrium of the conjectured form if the legislators are
sufficiently patient. These restrictions on the discount factor are weakest when r = 1.12 In
that case, it is necessary and sufficient that δ ≥ 3/4, and then equilibria are characterized
by
α3 = γ2 = β1 +
3
δ
− 3.
When r = 1 and δ = 3/4, the minimum possible discount factor, it follows that α3 =
γ2 = 1 and β1 = 0. If δ is higher, there will be a range of mixed strategy equilibria: when
δ = 6/7, for example, one equilibrium will be α3 = γ2 = .65 and β1 = .15.
In the above model, as in Model 4, the status quo can be proposed with probability
strictly between zero and one in equilibrium, as when r = 1 and δ = 6/7: in this case,
we have demonstrated an equilibrium in which α2 = 1 − α3 = .35. And, though we
have found a mixed strategy equilibrium in this case, there do not exist pure strategy
equilibria of the conjectured form nor, to our knowledge, any other.
In contrast to the preceding models, the next admits a stationary equilibrium in which
delay occurs with positive probability. Note that the legislators in this model are risk
neutral.
Model 7: An equilibrium with delay. Let n = 3, X = [0, 1], each ρi = 1/3, q = 0,
let D be majority rule, u1(x) = 1 − x, and u2(x) = u3(x) = x. These utility functions
are concave and strictly quasi-concave but linear. It can be checked that there exists a
no-delay stationary equilibrium here, but we look for a stationary equilibrium with delay
of the following form: p1 = 0, A1 = [0, x(γ)], p2 = p3 = 1, and A2 = A3 = [x(γ), 1].
12For a point of reference, it can be checked that, for the case ui(x) = −||x˜i − x||, we have r = 1 if
the distance between x˜1 and the status quo is
√
2√
3+1
.
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Using the expression for γ in the Appendix, we have
γ({0}) = 1− δ + δ
(
ρ1(1− δ)
1− δρ1
)
γ({1}) = δ
(
ρ2 + ρ3
1− δρ1
)
.
Thus,
x(γ) = δ
(
ρ2 + ρ3
1− δρ1
)
.
By risk neutrality, the acceptance sets so-defined satisfy weak dominance, and proposal
strategies clearly satisfy sequential rationality. But, because legislator 1’s proposal is
rejected and the other legislators propose a socially acceptable policy distinct from the
status quo, this equilibrium exhibits delay: with probability ρ1 > 0, the status quo q = 0
will be obtained for a finite number of periods and be replaced by x = 1. Note that
equilibrium delay would not be possible given these three legislators if we let just one,
say legislator 2, have a strictly concave utility function: then legislator 1 could offer 2 a
policy slightly to the left of x(γ), and this would pass.13
Finally, we turn to a model in which the legislators use a supermajority voting rule to
choose from a two-dimensional policy space. Recall that in Models 1-3, when the status
quo was in the core, it was the only possible bargaining outcome. In Model 4, when the
status quo was at (0, 0), the core point, it was proposed by at least one legislator, but
others could propose other policies. In contrast, in the next model the status quo is in
the core, yet it is proposed by no legislator. Moreover, the status quo is not even in the
social acceptance set.
Model 8: An equilibrium in which the status quo lies in the core but is not socially
acceptable. Let n = 5, let X ⊆ <2 with status quo q as in Figure 3, and let each
ρi = 1/5. Define the supermajority voting rule D so that four or more votes are required
for passage: D = {C ⊆ N | |C| ≥ 4}. Let the utility functions ui have ideal points and
circular indifference curves as in Figure 3.
[ Figure 3 about here. ]
Let legislator 1 mix over x and y with equal probabilities, and let each legislator i =
2, 3, 4, 5 propose pi, as in Figure 3. We further specify utilities as follows. Defining
vi =
ui(x) + ui(y)
10
+
1
5
5∑
j=2
ui(pj)
13But if we replicate these legislators one time, for a total of six, and if we let just legislator 2 have
a strictly concave utility function, then we still have delay: a proposal slightly to the left of x(γ) would
garner only three votes and would fail.
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for each legislator, we require
u1(p3) = u1(p4) = (1− δ)u1(q) + δv1
u2(x) = (1− δ)u2(q) + δv2
u3(y) = u3(p5) = u3(p4) = (1− δ)u3(q) + δv3
u4(x) = u4(p2) = u4(p3) = (1− δ)u4(q) + δv4
u5(y) = (1− δ)u5(q) + δv5.
It is clear that this is consistent with our assumption that utilities be concave. Letting
Ai consist of policies x such that ui(x) ≥ (1− δ)ui(q) + δvi, weak dominance is satisfied,
and it is then clear from Figure 3 that sequential rationality is satisfied as well. Here,
the core is the shaded polygon and contains the status quo, yet legislators 1, 2, and 5
would vote against the status quo if it were proposed.
4 General Results on Legislative Bargaining
4.1 Existence of Stationary Equilibria
In this subsection, we address two theoretical issues of fundamental importance for the
applicability of the model described in the previous sections, namely, the existence and
continuity properties of stationary equilibria. In each of the models of the previous
section, a no-delay stationary equilibrium exists. Our first theorem establishes existence
of no-delay stationary equilibria as a general result, despite the possibility that the status
quo is favorable to some legislators.
Theorem 1 There exists a no-delay stationary equilibrium.
A further desirable property of equilibria is uniqueness. As Model 4 demonstrates,
however, there may be multiple no-delay stationary equilibria, and in fact these need not
even be payoff-equivalent. Cho and Duggan (2002) provide a one-dimensional example
with multiple stationary equilibria that are not payoff equivalent, so it is known that no
general uniqueness result is available.14 The above existence proof uses mixed proposal
strategies because, given stationary strategies for the other legislators, the set of propos-
als optimal for a legislator need not be convex. This possible non-convexity may arise
because the set of socially acceptable proposals may itself be non-convex, as in Model 6.
Thus, as in the theory of Nash equilibrium, mixing serves an important technical role in
establishing existence of stationary equilibria.
In the one-dimensional Models 1, 2, and 3, however, we found only pure strategy
equilibria. The next theorem establishes this as a general result for one-dimensional policy
14Cho and Duggan (2002) prove that there is exactly one no-delay stationary equilibrium under the
assumption of quadratic utilities. More generally, they prove that the social acceptance sets of no-delay
stationary equilibria are nested, and that the minimal and maximal equilibria are unique.
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spaces. In fact, the result holds with no limit on the number of issues for a restricted class
of voting rules. We say the voting rule D is oligarchic if there is a nonempty coalition
C ⊆ N of legislators that is decisive and is contained in every other decisive coalition,
i.e., D = {C ′ ⊆ N | C ⊆ C ′}. This class of rules does not include majority rule, but
it does contain the interesting case of unanimity rule. As another example, consider a
majoritarian parliament where bargaining takes place among parties, which have weights
in proportion to their size; if there is one party with more than half of the seats, then
the voting rule is oligarchic.
Theorem 2 Assume either d = 1 or the voting rule D is oligarchic. Every no-delay
stationary equilibrium is in pure strategies.
This result simplifies the analysis of the bargaining model in a variety of environments,
where we only need to work with pure proposal strategies, which are more tractable than
mixed strategies. That Theorem 2 does not hold in multiple dimensions is demonstrated
in Models 5 and 6, where we have found mixed strategy equilibria. In multidimensional
settings, we do not know whether pure strategy equilibria always exist, but, in the latter
model, there failed to exist pure strategy equilibria of a simple form for some parameter
values. We conjecture that, for those values, the only equilibria are mixed and that
mixing is needed for our general existence result.
We next take up the issue of equilibrium continuity. The stationary equilibria of our
model are parameterized by the legislators’ recognition probabilities, ρ = (ρ1, . . . , ρn) ∈ ∆
(the unit simplex in <n), the status quo, q ∈ X, and the discount factor, δ ∈ [0, 1). To
these we add information about utility functions: let Λ ⊂ <k be a set parameterizing
profiles of utility functions, so the legislators’ preferences can be represented as ui(x) =
ui(x, λ) for some λ ∈ Λ. Assume that each ui is jointly continuous in (x, λ), that each
ui(·, λ) is concave in x, and that LSWP is satisfied for all λ ∈ Λ. As examples of such
parameterizations, we could have Λ ⊆ <nd and λ = (λ1, . . . , λn) ∈ Λ, with each λi
representing the ideal point of a quadratic utility function for legislator i. Or, more
generally, λi might be the matrix defining weighted Euclidean distance utilities (see
Hinich and Munger, 1997). For parameters ρ, q, δ, and λ, let E(ρ, q, δ, λ) denote the set
of no-delay stationary equilibrium mixed proposal profiles. Our next result formalizes
the idea that “small” variations in (ρ, q, δ, λ) cannot lead the set E(ρ, q, δ, λ) of no-delay
stationary equilibria to “blow up.”15
Theorem 3 The correspondence E of no-delay stationary equilibria is upper hemicon-
tinuous in the parameters of the model.
This continuity of the no-delay stationary equilibrium proposal strategies is familiar
from the Romer-Rosenthal model (Model 1), where the agenda setter’s proposal pn =
x˜m + |q − x˜m| is clearly continuous in q. Moreover, because there is a unique no-delay
stationary equilibrium when ρn = 1, no-delay stationary equilibrium proposals will be
15See the Appendix for a formal definition of upper hemicontinuity.
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close to this when ρn is close to one or when utility functions are close to quadratic. In the
Krehbiel model (Model 2), continuity of the median’s proposal with respect to the status
quo is also apparent. And, because there is a unique no-delay stationary equilibrium
when ρm = 1, no-delay stationary equilibrium proposals will be close to this when ρm
is close to one or when utilities are close to quadratic. Continuity is also demonstrated
in Model 3, where ∆ is a continuous function of the discount factor, the median voter’s
ideal point, and the status quo. Similarly, continuity is exhibited in Model 5, where the
probability of being offered a positive amount of cake and the amount of the offer are
continuous in the parameters of the model.
That Theorem 3 does not extend to all stationary equilibria, including those with
delay, can be seen from Model 7. There, we found a stationary equilibrium in which
legislator 1 proposes p1 = 0, which is rejected. Indeed, we could have specified any
p1 ∈ [0, x(γ)), as all of these proposal would also be rejected. However, fixing the
others’ strategies, p1 = x(γ) does not constitute a stationary equilibrium. The reason
is that this proposal would be accepted, increasing the continuation values of legislators
2 and 3 discontinuously, and then the acceptance sets A2 = A3 = x(γ) would no longer
satisfy weak dominance. We conclude that the set of all stationary equilibrium proposal
strategies is not even closed-valued, let alone closed graph.
4.2 Stability of the Status Quo
We now turn to the issue of stability of the status quo in the stationary equilibria of our
bargaining model and, in particular, the possibility of delay. We have already established
the existence of equilibria without delay, but Theorem 1 leaves open the possibility that
there are other equilibria in which some proposals are rejected. This is an especially
interesting issue because delay is difficult to explain in models of complete information,
and because it is an empirically verifiable aspect of the bargaining process. Recall that,
of the special cases with strictly concave utilities, the only equilibrium with delay were
in Model 3, where the status quo was at the median and there was a static equilibrium
in which every proposal was rejected. Our next theorem establishes this as a general
result: if legislators put any positive weight on the future and if utility functions are
strictly concave, then every stationary equilibrium is either no-delay or static. Thus, the
outcome of bargaining in the first period will be the outcome in every period, whether it
is the status quo or some other policy immediately agreed upon.
As stated above, this result applies to the classical spatial model, but not to environ-
ments with a district-specific good, such as divide-the-dollar environments and local pub-
lic good economies, where strict concavity is generally violated. In the Baron-Ferejohn
model, however, we again found no equilibria with delay. We extend this observation
to environments in which the sum of utilities is strictly concave and in which limited
transfers are possible. We say the condition of limited transferability is satisfied if, for
every policy x ∈ X and every legislator i ∈ N , ui(x) > min{ui(y) | y ∈ X} implies there
is a policy z ∈ X such that, for every other legislator j 6= i, we have uj(z) > uj(x).
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The idea is that we can take goods away from legislator i and spread them across the
remaining legislative districts, making those legislators better off. This is clearly possible
in local public good economies, and the sum of utilities will also be strictly concave if
every legislator’s utility is strictly concave in her own district’s consumption.
Theorem 4 Assume δ > 0. Also assume that there is a decisive coalition C all the
members of which have strictly concave utility functions, i.e., ui is strictly concave for all
i ∈ C, or that the sum of utilities ∑i∈N ui is strictly concave and limited transferability
is satisfied. Every stationary equilibrium is either no-delay or static.
Equivalently, every stationary equilibrium with delay is static. An important impli-
cation of Model 7 is that the assumption of strict concavity in Theorem 4 cannot be
dropped completely: there we found an equilibrium in which delay occurs with positive
probability and yet the status quo is eventually replaced by another policy with proba-
bility one. This shows that an interesting form of delay can be obtained in our model,
but that the role of risk neutrality was crucial in that example. That a positive discount
factor is needed for Theorem 4 can be seen by modifying Model 3 with x˜m−1 < q < x˜m
and δ = 0. In the equilibrium found there, legislator m− 1 proposes q, but having m− 1
propose 2x˜m − q is also a stationary equilibrium: because δ = 0, this change does not
affect continuation values or acceptance sets, and legislator m− 1 is indifferent between
that proposal and q, the optimal choice from within the social acceptance set.
We now consider the possibility that in equilibrium all legislators propose the same
policy, meaning that there is no ex ante uncertainty about the outcome of bargaining.
In Models 3 and 4, we saw only two instances of such equilibria: in Model 3 with q = x˜m
and in Model 4, with every legislator proposing q = (0, 0). In both cases the equilib-
rium was static. Our next theorem shows that this connection holds generally and that
the conditions required for this coincidence of proposals are quite restrictive: unless all
legislators have the same ideal point, an equilibrium must be static.
Theorem 5 Assume that at least two legislators have distinct ideal points. If σ is a
no-delay stationary equilibrium in which every legislator proposes the same policy, i.e.,
there exists x ∈ X such that pii({x}) = 1 for all i ∈ N , then σ is static.
Thus, delay (assuming δ > 0) and coincidence of proposals (assuming at least two
legislators have distinct ideal points) each imply a stationary equilibrium is static: the
status quo obtains with probability one in every period. How restrictive is this conclu-
sion? We saw static equilibria in Models 3 and 4, but only when the status quo was
in the core. Our next result establishes this as a general necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for existence of a static equilibrium, under a very weak restriction on recognition
probabilities.
Theorem 6 Assume that every decisive coalition has positive recognition probability, i.e.,∑
i∈C ρi > 0 for all C ∈ D. There exists a static stationary equilibrium if and only if the
status quo is in the core, i.e., q ∈ K.
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The possibility of delay or coincidence of proposals therefore hinges on the possibility
that the status quo lies in the core, under quite weak conditions. When all legislators have
the same ideal point, contrary to the assumptions of Theorem 6, it is easy to construct
a stationary equilibrium exhibiting coincidence of proposals that is not static: every
legislator simply proposes the ideal point and votes for it. Except in that case, however,
Theorems 5 and 6 establish very general conditions under which delay and coincidence of
proposals each imply that the status quo is in the core. In particular, they are possible
only if the core is non-empty, a knife-edge condition for majority rule when there are
multiple issue dimensions. The next corollary on the possibility of delay follows directly
from the above results.
Corollary 7 Assume that δ > 0, that ρi > 0 for every legislator i ∈ N , and that the
status quo is not in the core, i.e., q /∈ K. If each ui is strictly concave, then there are no
stationary equilibria with delay.
The corollary is most relevant for higher dimensional issue spaces and voting rules
such as majority rule, for then the core is almost always empty. Our results have an
even starker consequence when transfers are possible, for then, for most voting rules of
interest, the core is always empty. We say the voting rule D is non-collegial if there is no
legislator in every decisive coalition, i.e.,
⋂
C∈D C = ∅. This is clearly true for majority
rule and any supermajority rule short of unanimity.
Corollary 8 Assume that δ > 0, that ρi > 0 for every legislator i ∈ N , and that D is
non-collegial. If the sum of utilities
∑
i∈N ui is strictly concave and limited transferability
is satisfied, then there are no stationary equilibria with delay.
Of course, similar corollaries hold for the possibility that all legislators propose the
same policy. We conclude that, for a very wide class of models, it will almost always be
the case that at least two legislators propose different policies with positive probability
and that the first proposal will pass.
4.3 Core Selection
Theorem 6 yields a general condition under which there exists at least one stationary
equilibrium that selects from the core with probability one: it is sufficient that the status
quo lies in the core. In this subsection, we strengthen this result significantly by showing
that, in many environments, if the status quo lies in the core, then it is the outcome of
every stationary equilibrium. Thus, for the case of majority rule, bargaining equilibria
always select from the set of medians, providing a game-theoretic foundation for the
well-known median voter theorem. Our result applies to very general voting rules when
the policy space is one-dimensional and to the comparatively limited class of oligarchic
voting rules when there are multiple issue dimensions.
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Theorem 9 Assume that ρi > 0 for every legislator i ∈ N . Also assume that d = 1
and D is proper or that D is oligarchic. For every no-delay stationary equilibrium σ, the
following implications hold.
(i)A = {q} ⇔ (ii) q ∈ K ⇒ (iii) q ∈ A.
Moreover, if δ > 0, then (iii)⇒ (ii).
The implication (iii)⇒ (ii) shows that, if legislators put any positive weight on the
future and the status quo is not in the core (q /∈ K), then the status quo lies outside
the social acceptance set (q /∈ A). Thus, no legislator proposes the status quo in any
no-delay stationary equilibrium. If voting is by unanimity rule, so that the core is the
set of Pareto optimal policies, then this simply means that no legislator would propose a
Pareto-dominated status quo. Under majority rule, however, it means that no legislator
will propose the status quo if it lies outside the interval of medians, which of course may
be quite small. That δ > 0 is needed for the result can be seen from Model 3 by setting
δ = 0: then legislator 1 proposes p1 = q ∈ A. That the result holds only in one dimension
can be seen from Model 6, where the core is empty, yet legislator 1 proposes the status
quo, which is in the social acceptance set.
By implication (ii)⇒ (i), if the status quo is in the core, then it is the only socially
acceptable policy, and so it is the only possible proposal in a no-delay equilibrium. Adding
Theorems 4 and 6, it will therefore be the only possible outcome of any stationary
equilibrium, with or without delay. Thus, if the policy space is one-dimensional or
the voting rule is oligarchic, and if the status quo is in the core, then the outcome
of bargaining necessarily lies in the core. If voting is by unanimity rule, this means that
a Pareto optimal status quo will necessarily be the unique policy outcome. For majority
rule in one dimension, this generalizes the conclusion from Model 3, where q = x˜m implied
that every legislator proposes x˜m, the unique equilibrium outcome. That the result does
not hold generally in more than one dimension can be seen from Model 4 with λ = 4,
where the status quo is in the core but is only proposed by one legislator. In fact, even the
weaker implication (ii) ⇒ (iii) does not hold generally: Model 8 shows that, if we omit
both the assumption of a single policy dimension and the assumption that the voting rule
is oligarchic, then the status quo may be in the core yet lie outside the social acceptance
set.
This “core selection” result is related to the issue of “core equivalence,” addressed in
Banks and Duggan (2000). There, we show that, assuming perfectly patient legislators
(δ = 1), the stationary equilibrium outcomes coincide with the core when either the
policy space is one-dimensional or the voting rule lies in a restricted class. That result
differs from from Theorem 9 in several ways. First, the core equivalence result of Banks
and Duggan (2000) gives conditions under which every core policy can be supported as
an equilibrium outcome, whereas we are presently selecting just one core policy, namely,
the status quo. Second, the restriction on voting rules used for the multidimensional case
in that paper is somewhat weaker than requiring D be oligarchic. Third, that paper relies
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on perfect patience, whereas we presently allow any discount factor. In fact, because of
the assumption of a bad status quo in that paper, core equivalence is impossible there
when the discount factor is strictly less than one. Lastly, our core selection result applies
only when the status quo is in the core, a condition that cannot even be formulated in a
model with a bad status quo.
An easy implication of our core selection result in Theorem 9, with the continuity
result of Theorem 3, is the following comparative static on the status quo: as in Model
3, when the status quo is close to the core, the proposals of the legislators will be also
be close to the core in every no-delay stationary equilibrium. In other words, moderate
status quos lead to moderate equilibrium policy outcomes. Given a set Y ⊆ X and a
policy x, let d(Y, x) = sup{d(x, y) | y ∈ Y } measure the distance from Y to x, where
d(x, y) is the usual Euclidean distance. Thus, d(Ak, q) → 0 in the next theorem implies
that social acceptance sets collapse to a single core point.
Theorem 10 Assume that ρi > 0 for every legislator i ∈ N . Also assume that d = 1
and D is proper or that D is oligarchic. Let qk → q ∈ K, and let {σk} be a correspond-
ing sequence of no-delay stationary equilibria with social acceptance sets {Ak}. Then
d(Ak, q)→ 0.
By Theorems 5 and 6, we know that, unless the status quo is in the core, stationary
equilibrium proposals will not be concentrated on any one core point. As a consequence,
if q /∈ K and there is only one core point (as in Model 3), then some non-core policies are
necessarily proposed. The next result shows, however, that in many environments there
will always be at least one core policy proposed and passed with positive probability. This
gives us a weaker core selection result: in every stationary equilibrium, a core policy will
be realized with positive probability.
Theorem 11 Assume that d = 1 and D is proper or that D is oligarchic. In every no-
delay stationary equilibrium σ, some legislator proposes a policy in the core, i.e., pi ∈ K
for some i ∈ N .
We saw no-delay stationary equilibria with non-core proposals in Model 3 when the
status quo was outside the core, i.e., q 6= x˜m. We also saw, however, that these proposals
converged to the core as the discount factor approached one. The next result establishes
this result as a general theorem, yielding an “asymptotic core selection” result as the
discount factor approaches one, regardless of the location of the status quo. The result
applies to very general voting rules when the policy space is one-dimensional, and it holds
for a class containing the oligarchic rules when there are multiple issue dimensions. We
say a voting rule is collegial if there is at least one legislator who belongs to every decisive
coalition, i.e.,
⋂
C∈D C 6= ∅. This class includes all oligarchic voting rules, including
unanimity rule. Given sets Y, Z ⊆ X, we let D(Y, Z) = inf{d(Y, z) | z ∈ Z} measure the
distance from Y to Z. Thus, the convergence result stated next, that D(Ak, K) → 0,
means that socially acceptable policies must be arbitrarily close to core policies as the
discount factor approaches one.
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Theorem 12 Assume that ρi > 0 for every legislator i ∈ N . Also assume that d = 1 and
D is proper or that D is collegial. Let δk → 1, and let {σk} be a corresponding sequence
of no-delay stationary equilibria with social acceptance sets {Ak}. Then D(Ak, K)→ 0.
In other words, legislative patience necessarily leads to moderate equilibrium policy
outcomes. The implications of Theorem 12 are strongest when the core is a small set. If
the voting rule D is majority rule with an odd number of legislators, for example, then
the core consists of the unique median ideal point of the legislators, and in that case
the stationary equilibrium outcomes of our bargaining model approach the prediction
of the median voter theorem as legislators exhibit greater patience. Though we do not
model the elections that produce legislative policy-makers, this result has an interesting
implication for the design of electoral institutions: if we view legislator utility functions
as representative of their districts, and if we view the discount factor of a legislator
as corresponding to the probability of reelection, then systems that offer a sufficient
incumbency advantage will lead to moderate policies.
5 Conclusion
This paper contributes a general model of legislative bargaining in which the status quo
is an arbitrary point in a multidimensional policy space. In contrast to other bargaining
models, the status quo is not assumed to be “bad,” and delay may be Pareto efficient.
And in contrast to the social choice approach, where the existence of core policies in
multiple dimensions is a significant problem, we prove existence of no-delay stationary
equilibria for any number of issue dimensions. We have investigated the conditions under
which delay is possible and found that, for the environments most interesting in policy-
making applications, delay will almost never occur. Finally, we have given sufficient
conditions for “core selection,” the event that stationary equilibrium outcomes always lie
in the core, and we have provided results on asymptotic core selection. Importantly, we
have found that moderate status quos lead to moderate policy outcomes, and legislative
patience also leads to moderation. While we have considered mainly foundational issues
here, we have proposed a general framework in which more substantive questions, about
the nature of public goods provided or the coalitions that form to pass proposals, for
example, can be taken up in special cases with more structure.
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Appendix A Technical Matters
To define LSWP, we denote i’s weak and strict upper contour sets at x, respectively, by
Ri(x) = {y ∈ X | ui(y) ≥ ui(x)}
Pi(x) = {y ∈ X | ui(y) > ui(x)},
and we let
RC(x) =
⋂
i∈C
Ri(x) and R(x) =
⋃
C∈D
RC(x),
with similar conventions used for PC(x) and P (x). That is, RC(x) consists of the policies
that every member of C weakly prefers to x, and R(x) consists of the policies weakly
preferred to x by all members of some decisive coalition, with similar interpretations of
PC(x) and P (x). Given Y ⊆ X, let Y denote the closure of Y . Then limited shared weak
preference is satisfied if, for all C ⊆ N and all x ∈ X,
|RC(x)| > 1 implies RC(x) ⊆ PC(x).
That is, if y (distinct from x) is weakly preferred to x by all members of a coalition
C, then it can be approximated by policies that all members of C strictly prefer to x.
We have given sufficient conditions for LSWP in Section 2. To see why strict quasi-
concavity implies LSWP, for example, suppose all members of coalition C weakly prefer
some policy y to x 6= y. Then every convex combination of x and y (with positive weight
on both) is strictly preferred to x by all members of C. Letting the weight on y go to one,
we approximate y by policies in PC(x), as required. Note that, with concavity, LSWP
implies strict quasi-concavity when d = 1.
The characterization of the core in one-dimensional environments is well-known (cf.
Austen-Smith and Banks, 1999). Let x be the lowest ideal point, subject to the constraint
that the legislators to the right are not decisive, i.e., C1 = {i ∈ N | x˜i > x} /∈ D, and let
x be the greatest ideal point subject to the constraint that the legislators to the left are
not decisive, i.e., C2 = {i ∈ N | x˜i < x} /∈ D. Then K = [x, x], which is nonempty as
long as D is proper.
Given a stationary strategy profile σ, the probability measure ν is defined as follows:
given measurable Y ⊆ X,
ν(Y ) =
∑
j∈N ρj[pij(Y ∩ A) + IY (q)(1− δ)pij(X \ A)]
1− δ∑j∈N ρjpij(X \ A) ,
where IY (q) is the indicator function that takes value one if q ∈ Y and zero otherwise.
The continuation distribution, γ, is then defined as γ(Y ) = (1− δ)µ(Y ) + δν(Y ), where
µ is the point mass on q.
Finally, in the following proofs, we refer to a subset G ⊆ X as open if it is open in
the relative topology, i.e., if there is an open subset G′ of <d such that G = X ∩G′.
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Theorem 1 There exists a no-delay stationary equilibrium.
Proof : To prove existence, let pi denote a profile of mixed proposal strategies, and define
vi(pi) =
∑
j∈N
ρj
∫
ui(z)pij(dz),
which would be i’s continuation value if each pij put probability one on socially acceptable
proposals. Note that, since ui is continuous, vi(pi) is continuous in the weak topology on
[P(X)]n. For all i ∈ N , define
Ai(pi) = {x ∈ X | ui(x) ≥ (1− δ)ui(q) + δvi(pi)},
and, following our earlier conventions, let
AC(pi) =
⋂
i∈C
Ai(pi) and A(pi) =
⋃
C∈D
AC(pi).
Letting γ denote the continuation distribution corresponding to the stationary strategy
profile σ = ((pi1, A1(pi)), . . . , (pin, An(pi))), concavity implies x(γ) =
∫
z dγ ∈ Ai(pi) for
all i ∈ N . These sets are compact by compactness of X and continuity of ui, and
they are convex by convexity of X and concavity of ui. For all C ∈ D, AC(pi) is also
nonempty, compact, and convex. And A(pi) =
⋃
C∈D AC(pi) is nonempty and compact,
but not necessarily convex. That A(pi) is continuous as a correspondence follows from
the arguments in the proof of Theorem 7 in Banks and Duggan (2000). For all i ∈ N ,
define the optimal proposal correspondence,
Mi(pi) = argmax{ui(x) | x ∈ A(pi)},
constraining the proposer to A(pi). By the Theorem of the Maximum (Aliprantis and
Border 1994, Theorem 14.30), Mi has nonempty and compact values and is upper hemi-
continuous. However, it is not necessarily convex-valued, since A(pi) is not necessarily
convex. Let Bi(pi) = P(Mi(pi)) denote the set of mixtures of constrained optimal pro-
posals for i, which defines a nonempty-, compact-, convex-valued, upper hemicontinuous
correspondence (Aliprantis and Border 1994, Theorem 14.14). Define the correspondence
B: [P(X)]n →→ [P(X)]n by
B(pi) = B1(pi)× · · · ×Bn(pi).
This correspondence is also nonempty-, compact-, convex-valued and upper hemicon-
tinuous (Aliprantis and Border 1994, Theorem 14.14). Since [P(X)]n is convex and is
compact in the weak topology, Glicksberg’s theorem (Aliprantis and Border 1994, Corol-
lary 14.50) yields a fixed point of B, which we denote pi∗ = (pi∗1, . . . , pi
∗
n). We claim
that σ∗ = ((pi∗1, A1(pi
∗)), . . . , (pi∗n, An(pi
∗))) is a no-delay stationary equilibrium. By con-
struction, this profile satisfies weak dominance and each pi∗i puts probability one on i’s
utility-maximizing policies in A(pi∗). We have left to check that a proposer i cannot
obtain a higher expected payoff by proposing a policy outside A(pi∗). That payoff is
(1− δ)ui(q) + δvi(σ∗). Letting γ∗ denote the continuation distribution corresponding to
pi∗, concavity implies that payoff is less than or equal to ui(x(γ∗)). Since x(γ∗) ∈ A(pi∗),
we have sequential rationality, as required.
28
Theorem 2 Assume either d = 1 or the voting rule D is oligarchic. Every no-delay
stationary equilibrium is in pure strategies.
Proof : First, assume that d = 1 and D is proper. Using the notation from the proof of
Theorem 1, we first note that A(pi) is convex for all pi. To see this, let x = maxA(pi) and
x = minA(pi), which exist by compactness of A(pi), and let C and C satisfy x ∈ AC(pi)
and x ∈ AC(pi). Letting γ = ∑i∈N ρipii, concavity implies x(γ) ∈ [x, x] = convA(pi).
By concavity, we have x(γ) ∈ AC(pi) ∩ AC(pi). Take any y ∈ convA(pi), and suppose
without loss of generality that y ∈ [x, x(γ)]. Since AC(pi) is convex, by concavity, we
have y ∈ AC(pi) ⊆ A(pi), as required. If σ is a no-delay stationary equilibrium with
mixed proposal profile, then it follows that A(pi) is convex. By LSWP, each ui has a
unique ideal point in X, and then d = 1 and concavity yield strict quasi-concavity. Thus,
each ui has a unique maximizer in A(pi), and pii must put probability one on that policy.
Now assume D is oligarchic, with C = ⋂C′∈D C ′. Let σ be any no-delay stationary
equilibrium. Then A(pi) = AC(pi). Take any i ∈ N , and suppose that distinct policies
x′ and x′′ solve max{ui(x) | x ∈ A(pi)}. Letting γ denote the continuation distribution
corresponding to σ, note that conavity implies x(γ) ∈ A(pi) and, therefore, ui(x′) =
ui(x
′′) ≥ ui(x(γ)) ≥ (1− δ)ui(q)+ δvi(σ). Thus, x′, x′′ ∈ AC∪{i}(pi). Let C ′ consist of the
members j of C ∪{i} such that uj(x′) > uj(x′′), and let G be an open set around x′ such
that, for all j ∈ C ′ and all y ∈ G, we have uj(y) > uj(x′′). Since x′′ ∈ Aj(pi) for all such j,
this implies uj(y) > (1−δ)uj(q)+δvj(σ). Let C ′′ = (C∪{i})\C ′ consist of the members j
of C∪{i} such that uj(x′′) ≥ uj(x′). Of course, i ∈ C ′′. By LSWP and x′ ∈ AC′(pi), there
exists z ∈ X such that, for all j ∈ C ′′, we have uj(z) > uj(x′) ≥ (1 − δ)uj(q) + δvj(σ).
Choosing α ∈ (0, 1) small enough that zα = (1− α)x′ + αx′′ ∈ G, concavity implies that
uj(zα) > (1− δ)uj(q)+ δvj(σ) for all j ∈ C. Thus, zα ∈ A(pi), and, since i ∈ C ′′, we have
ui(zα) > ui(x
′), a contradiction. Therefore, each ui has a unique maximizer in A(pi), and
pii must put probability one on that policy.
We say that E is upper hemicontinuous if, for every (ρ, q, δ, λ) and every open set
Y ⊆ [P(X)]n with E(ρ, q, δ, λ) ⊆ Y , there exists an open set Z ⊆ ∆ × X × [0, 1) × Λ
with (ρ, q, δ, λ) ∈ Z such that, for all (ρ′, q′, δ′, λ′) ∈ Z, we have E(ρ′, q′, δ′, λ′) ⊆ Y .
Theorem 3 The correspondence E of no-delay stationary equilibria is upper hemicon-
tinuous in the parameters of the model.
Proof : Given parameters ρ and λ, and given a profile pi of mixed proposal strategies,
define
vi(pi, ρ, λ) =
∑
j∈N
∫
ui(z, λ)pij(dz)
for all i ∈ N . This would be i’s continuation value if each pij put probability one on
the social acceptance set. By continuity of ui and Billingsley’s (1968) Theorem 5.5, vi is
jointly continuous. Define
Ai(pi, ρ, q, δ, λ) = {x ∈ X | ui(x) ≥ (1− δ)ui(q, λ) + δvi(pi, ρ, λ)}
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and write AC(pi, ρ, q, δ, λ) and A(pi, ρ, q, δ, λ) using the usual conventions. Letting γ =∑
j∈N ρjpij, concavity implies x(γ) ∈ Ai(pi, ρ, q, δ, λ) for all i ∈ N , which implies that
the correspondence A has non-empty values. Continuity of A follows from Theorem 7 of
Banks and Duggan (2000). By the Theorem of the Maximum, the correspondence Mi of
constrained optimal proposals, defined by
Mi(pi, ρ, q, δ, λ) = argmax{ui(x) | x ∈ A(pi, ρ, q, δ, λ)},
has nonempty and compact values and is upper hemicontinuous. It follows that the
correspondence Bi, defined by Bi(pi, ρ, q, δ, λ) = P(Mi(pi, ρ, q, δ, λ)) also possesses these
properties. Since Bi has closed values and regular range as well, it has closed graph
(Aliprantis and Border 1994, Theorem 14.11). Now, let (ρk, qk, δk, λk) → (ρ◦, q◦, δ◦, λ◦),
and take any sequence {pik} such that pik ∈ E(ρk, qk, δk, λk) for all k. Suppose pik → pi◦.
Since piki ∈ Bi(ρk, qk, δk, λk) for all k and since Bi has closed graph, we see that pi◦i ∈
Bi(ρ
◦, q◦, δ◦, λ◦) for all i ∈ N . We claim that σ◦, with σ◦i = (pi◦i , Ai(pi◦, ρ◦, q◦, δ◦, λ◦)) for
all i ∈ N , is a no-delay stationary equilibrium. Clearly, legislator acceptance sets satisfy
weak dominance. If pi◦i does not satisfy sequential rationality, then i’s expected payoff
from proposing a rejected policy exceeds the payoff from pi◦i , i.e.,
(1− δ◦)ui(q◦, λ◦) + δ◦vi(pi◦, ρ◦, λ◦) >
∫
ui(z)pi
◦
i (dz).
Since these payoffs are jointly continuous, however, this strict inequality must hold for
high enough k, contradicting pik ∈ E(ρk, qk, δk, λk). Therefore, pi◦ ∈ E(ρ◦, q,◦ , δ◦, λ◦),
and we conclude that E has closed graph. Since it has compact Hausdorff range space
as well, it is upper hemicontinuous (Aliprantis and Border 1994, Theorem 14.12).
Theorem 4 Assume δ > 0. Also assume that there is a decisive coalition C all the
members of which have strictly concave utility functions, i.e., ui is strictly concave for all
i ∈ C, or that the sum of utilities ∑i∈N ui is strictly concave and limited transferability
is satisfied. Every stationary equilibrium is either no-delay or static.
Proof : Assume δ > 0. First, assume there exists C ∈ D such that, for all i ∈ C,
ui is strictly concave. Since δ < 1, the status quo has positive mass according to the
continuation distribution γ. If σ is not static, then, since δ > 0, γ is not concentrated on
q, so strict concavity implies
ui(x(γ)) > (1− δ)ui(q) + δvi(σ) (9)
for all i ∈ C. By continuity, there is an open set G around x(γ) such that the inequality
(9) holds for all x ∈ G. Since C ∈ D, we then have G ⊆ A. Now consider any legislator
j ∈ N , and let x˜j be j’s unique utility-maximizing policy. We claim that there exists
z ∈ G such that uj(z) > (1−δ)uj(q)+δvj(σ). This is clearly true if x˜j = x(γ). Otherwise,
we have uj(x˜
j) > uj(x(γ)) ≥ (1− δ)uj(q) + δvj(σ), and the claim follows from concavity
by setting α ∈ (0, 1) small enough that z = (1 − α)x(γ) + αx˜j ∈ G. Therefore, by
sequential rationality, we have pij(A) = 1, so that σ is no-delay.
Now assume that
∑
i∈N ui is strictly concave and that limited transferability is sat-
isfied. Since δ < 1, the status quo has positive mass according to the continuation
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distribution γ. If σ is not static, then, since δ > 0, γ is not concentrated on q, so strict
concavity implies ∑
i∈N
ui(x(γ)) >
∑
i∈N
[(1− δ)ui(q) + δvi(σ)].
By concavity of each ui, it follows that there exists i ∈ N such that ui(x(γ)) > (1 −
δ)ui(q) + δvi(σ), and sequential rationality then implies that pii(A) = 1. Furthermore,
ui(x(γ)) > min{ui(y) | y ∈ X}. By limited transferability, there exists z ∈ X such that,
for all j 6= i, uj(z) > uj(x(γ)). Choose α ∈ (0, 1) small enough that zα = (1−α)x(γ)+αz
satisfies ui(zα) > (1 − δ)ui(q) + δvi(σ). By concavity, we have uj(zα) > uj(x(γ)) ≥
(1 − δ)uj(q) + δvj(σ) for all j 6= i, so zα ∈ A, and sequential rationality then implies
pij(A) = 1 for all j 6= i. Thus, σ is no-delay, as required.
Theorem 5 Assume that at least two legislators have distinct ideal points. If σ is a
no-delay stationary equilibrium in which every legislator proposes the same policy, i.e.,
there exists x ∈ X such that pii({x}) = 1 for all i ∈ N , then σ is static.
Proof : Let σ be a no-delay stationary equilibrium for which there exists x ∈ X such that,
for all i ∈ N , pii({x}) = 1. Thus, the continuation distribution places probability 1−δ on
q and probability δ on x. If σ is not static, then x 6= q, and it follows that x 6= x(γ). Let
C consist of the legislators i such that ui(x) ≥ (1 − δ)ui(q) + δvi(σ), i.e., x ∈ Ai. Since
σ is no-delay, C ∈ D. Let C ′ consist of the members j of C such that uj(x) > uj(x(γ)),
and let G be any open set around x such that, for all j ∈ C ′ and all y ∈ G, we have
uj(y) > uj(x(γ)). By concavity, it follows that, for all j ∈ C ′ and all y ∈ G, we also
have uj(y) > (1− δ)uj(q) + δvj(σ). Let C ′′ = C \C ′ consist of the members j of C such
that uj(x(γ)) ≥ uj(x). By LSWP, there exists z ∈ X such that, for all j ∈ C ′′, we have
uj(z) > uj(x). Then choosing α ∈ (0, 1) small enough that zα = (1 − α)x + αz ∈ G,
concavity implies uj(zα) > uj(x) ≥ (1 − δ)uj(q) + δvj(σ) for all j ∈ C ′′. Therefore,
uj(zα) > (1− δ)uj(q) + δvj(σ) for all j ∈ C, and, since C ∈ D, weak dominance implies
zα ∈ A. Suppose C ′′ 6= ∅, and take i ∈ C ′′. Then ui(zα) > ui(x) and zα ∈ A contradict
sequential rationality. Thus, C = C ′, and we have ui(x) > (1 − δ)ui(q) + δvi(σ) for all
i ∈ C. Since C ∈ D, weak dominance implies that x is in the interior of A. Now suppose
that uj(y) > uj(x) for some j ∈ N and y ∈ X. Then, for small enough β ∈ (0, 1), we have
(1−β)x+βy ∈ A, and, by concavity, uj((1−β)x+βy) > uj(x), contradicting sequential
rationality. It follows that x is maximal for every legislator i, but this contradicts our
assumption that at least two legislators have distinct ideal points. Therefore, σ is static.
Theorem 6 Assume that every decisive coalition has positive recognition probability, i.e.,∑
i∈C ρi > 0 for all C ∈ D. There exists a static stationary equilibrium if and only if the
status quo is in the core, i.e., q ∈ K.
Proof : Let σ be a static stationary equilibrium, and suppose q /∈ K, i.e., there exist
C ∈ D and y ∈ X such that ui(y) > ui(q) = vi(σ) for all i ∈ C. By weak dominance,
y ∈ AC ⊆ A. Then, for all i ∈ C, sequential rationality implies pii(A \ {q}) = 1. But,
because
∑
i∈C ρi > 0, this contradicts the assumption that σ is static. Now let q ∈ K, and
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define σ by having each i ∈ N propose pi = q and accept Ai = Ri(q). Since vi(σ) = ui(q)
for all i ∈ N , this profile satisfies weak dominance. If sequential rationality is violated,
then there exist i ∈ N and y ∈ A such that ui(y) > ui(q). But y ∈ A implies y ∈ AC for
some C ∈ D, i.e., ui(y) ≥ ui(q) for all i ∈ C. By LSWP, however, there exists z ∈ X such
that ui(z) > ui(q) for all i ∈ C, contradicting q ∈ K. Therefore, sequential rationality is
satisfied, and σ is a stationary equilibrium.
Corollary 7 Assume that δ > 0, that ρi > 0 for every legislator i ∈ N , and that D is
non-collegial. If the sum of utilities
∑
i∈N ui is strictly concave and limited transferability
is satisfied, then there are no stationary equilibria with delay.
Proof : ¿From Theorems 4 and 6, it suffices to show that the core is empty. Take any
x ∈ X. If ui(x) = min{ui(y) | y ∈ X} for all i ∈ N , then take any alternative z ∈ X\{x},
so that z ∈ RN(x). By LSWP, there exists z′ ∈ PN(x), i.e., ui(z′) > ui(z) for all i ∈ N .
Since N ∈ D, this shows x /∈ K. If ui(x) > min{ui(y) | y ∈ X} for some i ∈ N , then
limited transferability yields a policy z ∈ X such that, for all j 6= i, uj(z) > uj(x). Since
D is non-collegial, there exists C ∈ D such that i /∈ C. Therefore, uj(z) > uj(x) for all
j ∈ C, and it follows that x /∈ K. We conclude that K = ∅, as required.
Theorem 8 Assume that ρi > 0 for every legislator i ∈ N . Also assume that d = 1
and D is proper or that D is oligarchic. For every no-delay stationary equilibrium σ, the
following implications hold.
(i)A = {q} ⇔ (ii) q ∈ K ⇒ (iii) q ∈ A.
Moreover, if δ > 0, then (iii)⇒ (ii).
Proof : Let σ be a no-delay stationary equilibrium. Note that (i) ⇒ (ii) holds gener-
ally. Indeed, if A = {q}, then σ is static. That q ∈ K then follows from Theorem 6.
The remainder of the proof is divided into two parts corresponding to the two sets of
assumptions in the theorem.
First, assume d = 1 and D is proper. We begin by showing (ii) ⇒ (iii). Suppose
q ∈ K, denote the ideal points of the legislators by x˜i, and let x˜1 ≤ x˜2 ≤ · · · ≤ x˜n. Then
there exist m1,m2 ∈ N such that K = [x˜m1 , x˜m2 ], C1 = {i ∈ N | i > m1} /∈ D, and
C2 = {i ∈ N | i < m2} /∈ D. Let A = [x, x]. If x = x, then all legislators propose the
same policy and, as long as some legislators have distinct ideal points, Theorem 5 implies
q ∈ A; if all legislators have the same ideal point, then q ∈ K implies that ideal point
is q, and again q ∈ A. So consider the case x < x, and suppose q /∈ A. In particular,
suppose q < x without loss of generality. Take any i ≤ m1, and note that x minimizes
ui over A. Since σ is no-delay, (2) implies that vi(σ) ≥ ui(x). Furthermore, q ∈ K
implies ui(q) > ui(x), so we have ui(x) < (1 − δ)ui(q) + δvi(σ), and then x /∈ Ai by
weak dominance. Therefore, the legislators who accept x are contained in C1, and it
follows that x /∈ A, a contradiction. Therefore, q ∈ A. We now suppose δ > 0 and show
(iii) ⇒ (i). From the above, this will imply (iii) ⇒ (ii), as in the theorem. Suppose
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q ∈ A. Let x = minA and x = maxA, and let C,C ∈ D satisfy x ∈ AC and x ∈ AC .
Since D is proper, there exists i ∈ C ∩ C. Thus,
min{ui(x), ui(x)} ≥ (1− δ)ui(q) + δvi(σ) =
∫
ui(z) γ(dz).
Since σ is no-delay, γ(A∪ {q}) = 1. Since q ∈ A, we have γ(A) = 1. Since ui is concave,
it attains its minimum over A at one of x or x, i.e.,
min{ui(x) | x ∈ A} = min{ui(x), ui(x)}.
Thus, γ must put probability one on i’s utility-minimizing socially acceptable proposals,
i.e.,
γ(argmin{ui(x) | x ∈ A}) = 1. (10)
As in the proof of Theorem 2, A is convex, so (1/2)x + (1/2)x ∈ A. Then sequential
rationality implies
ui(pi) ≥ ui((1/2)x+ (1/2)x) > min{ui(x), ui(x)} = min{ui(x) | x ∈ A},
where the strict inequality above follows from strict quasi-concavity. But this, δ > 0,
and ρi > 0, contradict (10). Therefore, x = x and A = {q}. Finally, we show (ii)⇒ (i).
Suppose q ∈ K. From the above, A = {q} follows if δ > 0, so suppose δ = 0. Again let
x˜1 ≤ x˜2 ≤ · · · ≤ x˜n and K = [x˜m1 , x˜m2 ], and consider any x < q. By weak dominance,
Ai = Ri(q), and, by concavity, the legislators who accept x therefore satisfy x˜i < q.
Thus, i accepts x only if x˜i < x˜m2 , and this coalition cannot be decisive. We conclude
that x /∈ A, and a similar argument holds for x > q, as required.
Now assume that D is oligarchic, and let C = ⋂C′∈D C ′. If ui(q) ≥ vi(σ) for some i ∈
C, then we claim that q = pj for all j ∈ N . Since σ is no-delay and ρj > 0 for all j ∈ N ,
we have pj ∈ A = AC for all j. Since i ∈ C, it follows that ui(pj) ≥ (1− δ)ui(q) + δvi(σ)
for all j ∈ N . Then
vi(σ) =
∑
j∈N
ρjui(pj) ≥ (1− δ)ui(q) + δvi(σ)
implies that vi(σ) ≥ ui(q), so we have vi(σ) = ui(q). Furthermore, pj ∈ Ai becomes
ui(pj) ≥ ui(q), and then ρj > 0 for all j ∈ N and
vi(σ) =
∑
j∈N
ρjui(pj) ≥ ui(q) = vi(σ)
imply that ui(pj) = ui(q) for all j ∈ N . If it is not the case that all legislators propose
q, then there exists j ∈ N such that pj 6= x(γ). Let C ′ consist of the members h of C
such that uh(pj) > uh(x(γ)), and let G be an open set around pj such that, for all h ∈ C ′
and all y ∈ G, we have uh(y) > uh(x(γ)). By concavity, for all h ∈ C ′ and all y ∈ G,
we also have uh(y) > (1 − δ)uh(q) + δvh(σ). Let C ′′ = C \ C ′ consist of the members h
of C such that uh(x(γ)) ≥ uh(pj). Of course, i ∈ C. By LSWP, there exists z ∈ X such
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that, for all h ∈ C ′′, we have uh(z) > uh(pj). Choosing α ∈ (0, 1) small enough that
zα = (1−α)pj +αz ∈ G, concavity implies that uh(zα) > uh(pj) ≥ (1− δ)uh(q) + δvh(σ)
for all h ∈ C. Thus, uh(zα) ≥ (1 − δ)uh(q) + δvh(σ) for all h ∈ C. Since C ∈ D, this
implies zα ∈ A. Then sequential rationality implies that
ui(pi) ≥ ui(zα) > ui(pj) = ui(q),
where the strict inequality follows from i ∈ C, contradicting ui(pi) = ui(q). Therefore,
ui(q) ≥ vi(σ) implies pj = q for all j ∈ N .
We now show (ii) ⇒ (iii). Suppose q ∈ K but q /∈ A. Then there exists j ∈ C
such that uj(q) < (1 − δ)uj(q) + δvj(σ), so δ > 0 and, by concavity, uj(q) < uj(x(γ)).
Since q ∈ K, there exists i ∈ C such that ui(q) ≥ ui(x(γ)) ≥ (1 − δ)ui(q) + δvi(σ),
and, since δ > 0, we have ui(q) ≥ vi(σ). Thus, we have pj = q for all j ∈ N , but then
x(γ) = q, contradicting uj(q) < uj(x(γ)). Therefore, q ∈ A. We next show (iii) ⇒ (i),
assuming δ > 0. From the above, this will imply (iii) ⇒ (ii), as in the theorem. If
q ∈ A, then, for all i ∈ C, we have ui(q) ≥ (1− δ)ui(q)+ δvi(σ). Since δ > 0, this implies
ui(q) ≥ vi(σ), so again pj = q for all j ∈ N . Suppose there exists x ∈ A with x 6= q. Then
ui(x) ≥ (1 − δ)ui(q) + δvi(σ) = ui(q) for all i ∈ C. By LSWP, there exists z ∈ X such
that ui(z) > ui(q) for all i ∈ C, and therefore z ∈ A. Then sequential rationality implies
that, for all i ∈ C, we have ui(pi) ≥ ui(z) > ui(q) = ui(pi), a contradiction. Therefore,
A = {q}. Finally, we show (ii)⇒ (i). Suppose q ∈ K. From the above, A = {q} follows
if δ > 0, so let δ = 0. Suppose there exists x ∈ A with x 6= q, so ui(x) ≥ ui(q) for all
i ∈ C. But then, by LSWP, there exists z ∈ X such that ui(z) > ui(q) for all i ∈ C,
contradicting q ∈ K. Therefore, A = {q}, as required.
Theorem 9 Assume that d = 1 and D is proper or that D is oligarchic. In every no-
delay stationary equilibrium σ, some legislator proposes a policy in the core, i.e., pi ∈ K
for some i ∈ N .
Proof : First, assume d = 1 and D is proper. Let A = [x, x]. Denote the ideal points
of the legislators by x˜i, and let x˜1 ≤ x˜2 ≤ · · · ≤ x˜n. Since d = 1 and D is proper,
there exist m1,m2 ∈ N such that K = [x˜m1 , x˜m2 ], C+1 = {i ∈ N | x˜i ≥ x˜m1} ∈ D, and
C+2 = {i ∈ N | x˜i ≤ x˜m2} ∈ D. If x˜m2 < x(γ), then, for all i ∈ C2, we have
ui(x˜m2) ≥ ui(x(γ)) ≥ (1− δ)ui(q) + δvi(σ),
i.e., x˜m2 ∈ AC2 . Since C2 ∈ D, we have x˜m2 ∈ A, and, by sequential rationality, pm2 =
x˜m2 . Similarly, if x(γ) < x˜m1 , then x˜m1 ∈ A and pm1 = x˜m1 . If x˜m1 ≤ x(γ) ≤ x˜m2 , then,
since x(γ) ∈ A, we have A∩K 6= ∅. Then, by sequential rationality, pm1 = x˜m1 if it is in
A or pm1 = minA ∈ K otherwise.
Now assume D is oligarchic, with C = ⋂C′∈D C ′, and consider i ∈ C and any proposal
pi ∈ A for legislator i. If pi /∈ K, then there exists x ∈ X such that, for all j ∈ C,
uj(x) > uj(pi). Since pi ∈ A, there exists C ′ ∈ D such that, for all j ∈ C ′, uj(pi) ≥
(1− δ)uj(q) + δuj(p). Since C ⊆ C ′, we have uj(x) > (1− δ)uj(q) + δuj(p) for all j ∈ C,
which implies x ∈ A. But then ui(x) > ui(pi) violates sequential rationality. Therefore,
we must have pi ∈ K in every no-delay equilibrium.
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Theorem 10 Assume that ρi > 0 for every legislator i ∈ N . Also assume that d = 1 and
D is proper or that D is collegial. Let δk → 1, and let {σk} be a corresponding sequence
of no-delay stationary equilibria with social acceptance sets {Ak}. Then D(Ak, K)→ 0.
Proof : In case D is collegial, specify i ∈ ⋂C∈D C arbitrarily, so that Ak ⊆ Aki for all k.
Since each σk is no-delay, this implies that
pikj ({x ∈ X | ui(x) ≥ (1− δk)ui(q) + δkvi(σk)}) = 1 (11)
for every legislator j ∈ N and for all k. In case d = 1 and D is proper, let yk = minAk
and zk = maxAk for all k, and let Ck, C
k ∈ D satisfy yk ∈ ACk and zk ∈ ACk . Since D
is proper, there exists ik ∈ Ck ∩Ck. Going to a subsequence if necessary, we may assume
that ik = i for all k. Thus, we have
min{ui(x) | x ∈ Ak} = min{ui(yk), ui(zk)} ≥ (1− δk)ui(q) + δkvi(σk)
for all k, where the first equality uses convexity of Ak, established in the proof of Theorem
2, and concavity of ui. Since pi
k
j (A
k) = 1 for all j and k, we again have (11). Thus, there
exists a subsequence of {σk} for which (11) holds for all j and all k. In the next three
paragraphs, we consider such a subsequence deduce further properties of it.
Define wki (j) to be the expected payoff to legislator i when j is selected to propose in
the equilibrium σk, i.e.,
wki (j) =
∫
ui(x)pi
k
j (dx), (12)
and note that vi(σ
k) =
∑
j∈N ρjwki (j). Letting
`k ∈ argmin{wki (j) | j ∈ N} and hk ∈ argmax{wki (j) | j ∈ N},
equations (11) and (12) imply
wki (`
k) ≥ (1− δk)ui(q) + δkρhkwki (hk) + δk
∑
j 6=hk
ρjw
k
i (j)
≥ (1− δk)ui(q) + δkρhkwki (hk) + δk(1− ρhk)wki (`k),
which implies that
min
j∈N
wki (j) ≥ max
j∈N
wki (j) +
1− δk
δkρhk
(ui(q)− wki (`k)) (13)
for all k. Since P(X) is compact in the weak topology, the sequence {(pik1 , . . . , pikn)} has a
convergent subsequence (also indexed by k) with limit, say, (pi1, . . . , pin). For all j ∈ N ,
define wi(j) =
∫
uidpij. Since ui is continuous, weak convergence implies w
k
i (j)→ wi(j),
and then (13) implies that wi(j) is independent of j, i.e., there exists wi such that
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wi(j) = wi for all j ∈ N . In general, for any legislator j, weak convergence implies that
the sequence {vj(σk)} of continuation values converges to
vj = lim vj(σ
k) =
∑
h∈N
ρh
∫
uj dpih, (14)
and for legislator i we have
vi = lim vi(σ
k) = lim
∑
j∈N
ρjw
k
i (j) = wi (15)
as well. Letting γk be the continuation distribution corresponding to σk, concavity implies
x(γk) ∈ Akj for all j and k, or in other words uj(x(γk)) ≥ (1−δk)uj(q)+δkvj(σk) for all j
and k. Letting γ denote the limit of continuation distributions, which is just
∑
j∈N ρjpij,
weak convergence implies x(γk) → x(γ), the mean of the probability measure γ, and
then, by continuity, we have uj(x(γ)) ≥ vj for all j ∈ N .
We claim that, for all j ∈ N , pij is the point mass on x(γ). If not, then there exists an
open set G around x(γ), a legislator j, and a subsequence of {(pik1 , . . . , pikn)} (still indexed
by k) such that, for all k, we have pikj (X \G) > 0. Letting Sk denote the support of pikj ,
this is equivalent to Sk \ G 6= ∅ for all k. Thus, for each k, there exists xk ∈ Sk \ G,
and going to a subsequence (still indexed by k) if needed, we assume that xk → x. For
all k, since σk is no-delay, there exists Ck ∈ D such that xk ∈ AkC . Note that i ∈ Ck by
(11). Again going to a subsequence (still indexed by k) if needed, we may assume that
Ck = C for all k, and of course i ∈ C. Thus, uh(xk) ≥ (1 − δk)uh(q) + δkvh(σk) for all
h ∈ C. An implication of continuity and (14) is then that uh(x) ≥ vh for all h ∈ C. Let
C ′ consist of the members h of C such that uh(x) > uh(x(γ)), and let G′ be any open set
around x such that, for all h ∈ C ′ and all y ∈ G′, we have uh(y) > uh(x(γ)). It follows
that, for all h ∈ C ′ and all y ∈ G′, we also have uh(y) > vh. Let C ′′ = C \ C ′ consist
of the members h of C such that uh(x(γ)) ≥ uh(x). By LSWP, there exists z ∈ X such
that, for all h ∈ C ′′, we have uh(z) > uh(x). Then choosing α ∈ (0, 1) small enough
that zα = (1 − α)x + αz ∈ G′, concavity implies uh(zα) > uh(x) ≥ vh for all h ∈ C ′′.
Therefore,  = minh∈C(uh(zα)− vh) > 0, and by (14) we have
uh(zα) ≥ (1− δk)uh(q) + δkvh(σk) + 
2
for all h ∈ C and for high enough k. Since C ∈ D, it follows from weak dominance that
zα ∈ Ak, and then, since i ∈ C, sequential rationality then implies that
wki (i) ≥ (1− δk)uh(q) + δkvi(σk) +

2
.
But this inequality, with (15), yields
wi = limw
k
i (i) ≥ lim vki +

2
= vi +

2
> wi,
a contradiction. Thus, each pikj indeed converges to the point mass on x(γ).
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We now claim that x(γ) ∈ K. If not, then there exist y ∈ X and C ∈ D such that,
for all j ∈ C, we have uj(y) > uj(x(γ)). From the above argument, it follows that
vj = uj(x(γ)) for all j ∈ N , and so we have uj(y) > (1− δk)uj(q)+ δkvj(σk) for all j ∈ C
and for high enough k. Thus, y ∈ Ak for high enough k. Let wkj (j) =
∫
ujpi
k
j be j’s
expected payoff when she proposes. This converges to uj(x(γ)), since pi
k
j converges to the
point mass on x(γ), and sequential rationality then implies wkj (j) ≥ uj(y) > uj(x(γ)) =
limwkj (j) for all j ∈ C and for high enough k, a contradiction. Thus, we conclude that
x(γ) ∈ K.
Finally, if not D(Ak, K) → 0, then there must exist  > 0 and a subsequence (also
indexed by k) such that D(Ak, K) ≥  for all k. We have shown that there is a further
subsequence (also indexed by k) such that each piki converges to the point mass on some
x ∈ K. Then d(Ak, x) ≥  implies that there exist yk ∈ Ak and Ck ∈ D such that
d(yk, x) > /2 and yk ∈ AkCk . Going to a subsequence (still indexed by k) if needed, we
may assume Ck = C for all k and yk → y. Thus, we have ui(yk) ≥ (1−δk)ui(q)+δkvi(σk)
for all i ∈ C and all k, and continuity then implies ui(y) ≥ ui(x) for all i ∈ C. Since
d(y, x) ≥ /2, we have y 6= x, and by LSWP, there exists z ∈ X such that ui(z) > ui(x)
for all i ∈ C. Thus, for high enough k, we have ui(z) > (1 − δk)ui(q) + δkvi(σk)
for all i ∈ C, which implies z ∈ Ak for high enough k. Sequential rationality then
implies wki (i) ≥ ui(z) > ui(x) = limwki (i) for high enough k, a contradiction. Therefore,
D(Ak, K) indeed converges to zero.
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